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IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
IN A PUBLIC AGENCY
David E. Freed, DP.A.
Western Michigan University, 1999
A major challenge that faces most institutions is that of adapting to and
managing change. The leadership of an organization is a key focal point for analyzing
how change is accomplished.
This study examines both a theoretical and practical approach to the study of
organizational and cultural change. The focus is a public agency and the actions and
decision processes of the top leadership relating to organizational and cultural change
during the period 1992 to 1995.
From the theoretical perspective, Karl Weick’s approach called sensemaking
is examined and a model is created. Sensemaking is an activity that is an explanatory
process and provides a method for comprehension of events, placement of items into
frameworks, and constructing meaning. One of its key distinguishing characteristics is
that it focuses on analyzing events retrospectively.
Interviews with 28 of the top leaders of the public agency provide a
retrospective analysis by those individuals o f the events surrounding the
organizational and cultural change efforts undertaken. These interviews provide the
basis for exploring the model of sensemaking. Additional explanatory framework for
sensemaking is provided through the work of Alan Briskin and his concepts o f the
soul and its shadow side in individuals, and the impact this has in the workplace.
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The interviewees were categorized into three groups, representing the top
three layers of leadership within the public agency. The similarities and differences
within and between these groups are explained relative to the sensemaking model,
and conclusions drawn from these comparisons. The results highlight the importance
of the interactions o f top leadership in an organization and how those interactions
impact organizational and cultural change efforts.
The importance o f this research is that it creates a model from Weick’s theory
of sensemaking and then provides a practical exploration o f the model through a
study of a major public agency over a 4-year period.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One challenge facing individuals in leadership positions at public institutions
at all levels of government is that of adapting to and managing change. This includes
change in the political and social climate in which an organization operates, changes
in available resources, and changes in the expectations of employees, stakeholder
groups and citizens. The challenge is to become more effective, more efficient and to
survive. Leaders need to gain as great an understanding as possible regarding the
impacts of their decisions. This necessitates an understanding o f how to energize
organizations and shape their environments in order to achieve desired objectives.
Most organizations want to be flexible and able to adapt in an ever-changing
environment. They want to be responsive to their key customers or stakeholders, and
to the public. They want motivated employees who are performing their duties
effectively and efficiently. Institutions have engaged in the implementation of new
management philosophies, and have searched for ways of altering their culture. The
constant that has emerged is that the status quo is neither acceptable nor possible. In
an ever-changing environment, public institutions need to be flexible and adaptable.
They must find new ways to improve the manner in which they accomplish their
stated mission, goals and objectives, and to alter themselves in response to internally
induced and/or externally imposed changes in these.
While a theoretical framework for analyzing organizational and cultural
change is important, the practitioner and theoretician both need to utilize case studies
1
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2
to provide for a comparative analysis between organizations and to test the theories.
As organizations will be continuously involved in change efforts at all levels over
time, what will comprise the body o f knowledge from which they can decide on
appropriate courses o f action? There need to be more real-life, documented examples
of change efforts in the literature to provide the practitioner with concrete examples
of success and failure, and to assist the academician in testing and developing the
theories of organizational and cultural change.
Weick (1995) advances an approach called sensemaking, which he describes
as a set of ideas which allow explanatory possibilities. Sensemaking is an activity
which is an explanatory process different from others such as interpretation or
attribution. There are seven distinguishing characteristics of the process. The process
is: (1) grounded in identity construction, (2) retrospective, (3) enactive of sensible
environments, (4) social, (5) ongoing, (6) focused on and by extracted cues, and
(7) driven by plausibility rather than accuracy. Sensemaking is about comprehension,
placement of items into frameworks, and constructing meaning.
Sensemaking provides a template for reviewing case studies and change
efforts. While Weick (1995) refers to the sensemaking process as a “low paradigm,”
and considers it to be part of the ongoing discussion for the field, it provides
opportunities for more robust discussion of the case study. Prior research has not
provided such a framework with its key emphasis focusing on analyzing events
retrospectively.
How can practitioners in the field achieve a deeper understanding of the
impacts their actions may have? How can researchers further advance the knowledge
of organizational theory and change? Sensemaking provides a framework for more
in-depth exploration of the art of organizational change and leadership.
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3
The focus will be on the actions and decision processes o f the top leadership
of a major public agency. Extensive use o f interviews of 28 key staff will be utilized,
as well as written material and observations. The intent is to, through this case study,
understand the events and compare and contrast them to the organizational and
leadership theory in the literature.
Weick (1995) describes sensemaking as being composed of two major
processes. These are belief-driven processes and action-driven processes. There are
at least two forms of belief-driven processes: argument and expectations. Argument
refers to reasoned discourse as well as the fact that any opinion is potentially
controversial and subject to at least two conflicting sides. Weick says that meetings
are the setting where most arguments occur. Expectations are more directive than are
arguments. They filter inputs, and their formation and activation are critical for
sensemaking.
There are at least two forms of action-driven processes: behavioral
commitment and manipulation. Commitment is focused on a single action, and
manipulation is focused on multiple simultaneous actions. Commitment is a state
where an individual is bound by his actions, and through the actions to beliefs that
support his involvement. Manipulation involves acting in ways that create an
environment that allows individuals to comprehend and manage.
For purposes of this study, sensemaking will be modeled as shown in
Figure 1:
BELIEF

Argument

Expectation

ACTION

Commitment

Manipulation

Figure 1. Model of Sensemaking.
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Purpose o f Research
The purpose o f the research is to explore the implementation of
organizational and cultural change in a major public agency (referred to as the
Agency) during the period 1992-1995. This case study will examine the major
initiatives undertaken and examine them within the framework of sensemaking put
forward by Weick (1995). Sensemaking will be defined as exploring events and
actions in order to place them into frameworks, construct meaning, and develop
comprehension. Interviews of 28 key leadership staff in the Agency will be the basis
of this examination.
Additionally, as part of the sensemaking approach applied to this study, the
work of Alan Briskin will be utilized. Mr. Briskin specializes in the areas o f role
analysis and systems thinking. In his book, The Stirring o f Soul in the Workplace
(Briskin, 1996), Mr. Briskin explores the soul and its shadow side in individuals, and
identifies potential consequences in the workplace. He indicates that in the past the
workforce has ignored the soul within individuals. Briskin’s concepts and ideas will
be explained and applied to the events and actions explored through the interviews
conducted in this study. This will provide a further enhancement to the exploration of
sensemaking and analysis of events.
Importance of the Research to Public Administration
and Contributions to Knowledge
This study will be a practical application of Weick’s (1995) theory. First, a
model of sensemaking has been created to guide this research and future research. It
will provide a mechanism for testing the theory and model, and for potentially
expanding or modifying the model based on the results. The approach of comparing
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and contrasting the three categories o f top management staff provides an increased
level o f comparison for such expansion or modification o f the model. It presents
viewpoints at three different levels in the organization. The concepts being explored
are relatively new, and little direct research has been conducted to date to test the
ideas and theory.
This research explores whether there is a directional component to the various
elements of the model. Weick (1995) maintains that it is not necessary to address the
components of sensemaking in any particular order.
This study will also provide contributions to knowledge based on several
factors. First, it is a study of a public agency consisting of over 3,100 employees.
Secondly, this agency has broad-based responsibilities. Third, the richness of detail
from an in-depth analysis, over a 4-year period, is unique. Being able to outline the
sequential steps that leadership took, the decisions made, the individuals involved,
how the organization and key stakeholders reacted, and the ultimate outcomes will
provide public administrators with a contribution to the body of knowledge that will
assist them as they contemplate or implement similar efforts in their respective
organizations. It will identify factors that were key in the success or failure of the
actions taken.
Background Information
In 1992, the Agency Director and the Leadership Team established a
Committee to conduct a study of the Agency and identify areas for improvement. The
Committee consisted o f 10 individuals representing a cross-section o f the Agency.
This author was designated as the Chair of the Committee. The Committee was given
nine charges to address, including: What alternative models of management should
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6
top management consider? What methods o f program coordination are now in place,
and how can they be improved? Are structural changes called for? What obstacles to
effective program decision making and coordination now exist, and how can these
processes be improved and streamlined? The report of the Committee addressed
these issues, and established a reference point for the future decisions made regarding
restructuring in the Agency.
The position of this author as Chair o f the Committee and as Chief o f Staff to
the Agency Director allows for a unique perspective relating to this research. Further,
it provides for a continuing perspective as to how the results were utilized by the
Agency Director and the top management team, and in analyzing the subsequent
events. The Committee’s report was the baseline from which decisions were made
relating to implementation of change.
The next step is to explore the concept of sensemaking by creating a model
and examining it through current interviews of the members o f the top management
in the Agency. This exploration focuses on a retrospective exploration of the events
to gain an understanding of them and explain what happened and why.
Research Strategy
The qualitative research design paradigm will be utilized. Some of the
underlying assumptions or basic characteristics of this mode of inquiry are outlined
below:
1. The ontological issue of the nature of reality is that the participants in a
study construct it, and it is multiple and subjective.
2. The epistemological assumption is that the researcher is interacting with
those being researched.
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3. The axiologicai assumption is that the study is value-laden and biased.
4. The rhetorical assumption is that the language of the research is informal,
that decisions are evolving, and that a personal voice is utilized.
5. The methodological assumption is that the research is an inductive process,
that there is an emerging design, that it is context-bound, and that patterns and
theories are developed for understanding (Creswell, 1994).
The research is well-suited to a qualitative design since it is exploratory. The
variables and theory base are unknown and therefore there is a need to describe the
phenomena, and the phenomena are not suited to quantitative measures.
The Type of Design
The research will utilize the case study method, which is drawn from political
science and many of the social sciences. In a case study the researcher is analyzing a
single entity or phenomenon which is bounded by time and activity. Information is
collected using a variety of data collection procedures.
In this instance organizational change in the public agency is being studied,
for a period between 1992 and 1995. Use of interviews of key staff conducted during
that time period will be utilized, as well as written material and observations. This
information will be further augmented by conducting new interviews with the top
management of the Agency during that time period. This will encompass the Agency
Director, Assistant Directors, and Office Chiefs. The intent of the case study method
is to explore the processes and events, understand them, and then compare them with
the model of sensemaking that has been developed.
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The Researcher’s Role
In qualitative research the role o f the researcher necessitates the identification
of personal assumptions and biases at the start of the study. The focus of study was
on the actions undertaken by the Director of the Agency and the Leadership Team to
implement organizational change during the time period o f the study. This author’s
role during this period was being Chief of Staff to the Agency Director, with whom I
had previously worked for 10 years. Consequently, there was daily contact with the
Agency Director and the members of the Leadership Team. This author was involved
in all o f the top-level activities relating to the change efforts, and worked closely with
staff and key stakeholder groups.
Prior to this time this author worked for 14 years in the Agency, and had
acquired a thorough understanding of the organization and its culture. This
background and understanding enhanced this author’s knowledge of challenges
presented by the change efforts. Attention was focused on the role and actions of the
Agency Director and the Leadership Team in implementing organizational change,
the relationships between key staff, the decision making involved, and the reactions
of the organization and stakeholders.
This author now works in a different Agency, as do some of the other key
staff. Many still reside in the Agency. Some have subsequently retired.
This author brought certain biases to this study. First, this author was a key
participant in many of the decisions that were made. This author did not always agree
with the final decision, and in those cases argued for a different course of action.
While this can help provide further insight, this author needed to protect against
promoting personal views. This author also maintained the perspective that the
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agency is so varied in its programs and duties that any Agency Director would
encounter difficulty in implementing organizational change.
Miles and Huberman (1984) have suggested parameters that researchers
should consider. These include the setting in which the research will take place, the
actors (those to be interviewed), and the events (what the actors will be interviewed
about). These parameters are addressed below.
Setting
The study was conducted in the public agency, with central office staff and
field location. There were approximately 3,100 full-time employees during the
1992-1995 time period. The Agency administered many programs. Additionally, its
responsibilities extended to economic and political terms in overseeing the allocation
and distribution o f these public resources.
The regulatory programs operated by the Agency conserve and manage the
resources by controlling access or limiting their use and removal. A majority of these
programs relied upon license or permit systems.
These programs were very controversial. Many created conflict because they
restricted what people can do. Costs may be imposed for the use o f resources. Public
concerns and interests change over time.
The Agency operated under the direction of a Commission, a seven-member
body appointed by the Governor. The Commission appointed the Agency Director,
who carried out Agency policy and program development under the overall direction
of the Commission.
Internally, the Agency was divided into three major program areas: Resource
Management, Environmental Protection, and Administration, each headed by a
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Assistant Director. Under these Assistant Directors, 22 Offices carried out the
Agency’s activities. Additionally, there were three Regional Offices, each headed by a
Regional Assistant Director. In October, 1995, an Executive Order o f the Governor
split the Agency.
Actors
The informants of the study were the Agency Director and the Leadership
Team, consisting of the six Assistant Directors and the 20 Office Chiefs. In some
instances, the individuals now work in the private sector or are retired.
Events
Utilizing a case study methodology and new interviews, the focus of this
study was to analyze the components of the sensemaking model in relation to
implementing organizational change in the Agency. This was done through
identifying the culture of the organization, whether members o f the Leadership Team
were supportive of the proposed changes and whether they had the confidence and
support of the employees and other stakeholders, as well as the processes used to
communicate the proposed changes. Current interviews were conducted to explore a
retrospective analysis of events in reference to the sensemaking model.
Processes
Particular attention was paid to the actions o f the Agency Director and the
Leadership Team in initiating change, building relationships, decision making and
providing leadership in relation to sensemaking.
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Ethical Considerations
Consideration was given to protecting the participants and any sensitive
information revealed. By the nature of the study, and the fact that it was being
conducted in a public institution which is highly visible, the rights and desires o f the
participants had to be safeguarded.
To that end, the rights and desires o f the informants were respected. The
research objectives were presented both verbally and in writing to ensure
understanding. The informants were made aware of how the data were to be used.
The consent of the informants (interviewees) was obtained. Transcripts were
made available to the informants, as well as any decisions regarding anonymity.
Data Collection Procedures
Several methods were utilized to collect the data. The nature of this research
was more qualitative and exploratory, as opposed to quantitative. In that light there
were no formal hypotheses to be tested. The central research questions were directed
at ascertaining the interviewees’ retrospective recollection of events related to
restructuring, and to relate those responses to the model of sensemaking.
The research methodology was essentially twofold. Primarily, a series of
interviews was conducted with knowledgeable individuals. These included the
Agency Director, seven Assistant Directors, and 20 Office Chiefs.
Secondly, the results of those interviews, in addition to material gathered
from Agency primary documents and other secondary sources, was qualitatively
compared to the model of sensemaking. The purpose of these efforts was to relate
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the data and information to the model to determine explanations o f the events, and to
highlight similarities and differences.
Data collected in 1992 were used, including one-on-one interviews with the
Agency Director, Assistant Directors, and Office Chiefs, as well as group interviews
conducted with Agency employees and stakeholders. Public documents in the form of
reports, letters, internal memoranda, and meeting minutes were utilized.
New interviews were conducted with the Agency Director and the Leadership
Team to obtain their retrospective analyses of key events. Consequently, these
interviewees were selected purposefully, not randomly. Appendix A is a copy of the
approval letter from the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) at
Western Michigan University.
Data Recording Procedures
Interviews were audiotaped. Notes were taken during the interviews using a
protocol.
Data Analysis Procedures
In qualitative analysis collecting the information, sorting it into categories,
formatting the information into a story or picture, and then writing the qualitative text
take place simultaneously (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992). The data that emerges from a
qualitative study is descriptive, reported in words rather than in numbers (Fraenkel &
Wallen, 1990).
Data analysis was conducted simultaneously with data collection. The analysis
was based on data reduction and interpretation (Marshall & Rossman, 1989) . Taped
interviews were transcribed verbatim. Notes and observations were regularly
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reviewed. The information was presented, to the extent possible, in matrices and
tables. The categories and codes were developed as the data was reviewed.
The goal was to explore the participants’ interpretations o f the organizational
change efforts with the model of sensemaking. This was the basis for the process of
segmenting the information (Tesch, 1990). For analysis purposes, the Leadership
Team was divided into three categories: (1) the Agency Director, (2) Assistant
Directors, and (3) Office Chiefs. Interviewees were asked questions to determine
where they reside in the model, and to determine where they would place each o f the
three categories of staff in the model.
The model of sensemaking was used to compare and contrast where the three
categories of interviewees reside. This is presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Sensemaking Grid for Comparisons of Interviewees
Agency Director

Assistant Directors

Office Chiefs

Argument
Expectation
Commitment
Manipulation

Each of the four components of sensemaking (Argument, Expectation,
Commitment, and Manipulation) were represented by a set of interview questions,
with each question being rated by the interviewee on a 1-5 Likert scale.
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By employing this detailed, retrospective analysis, conclusions may result
from this research which more fully explain the interactions of the participants and
lead to implications regarding the model.
Potential coding categories suggested by Bogdan and Biklen (1992) which
will be utilized include (a) setting and context codes, (b) perspectives held by
subjects, (c) subjects’ way of thinking about people and objects, and (d) relationship
and social structure codes.
One key method of data analysis in the case study method of research is
“explanation building,” where the researcher explores the information and attempts to
build an explanation (Yin, 1989). This method was utilized in relating information to
the sensemaking model.
Verification Steps
For internal validity, there was peer examination of the data. This individual
was Dr. Donald Inman, who also served on the dissertation Committee. Dr. Inman’s
direct experience with this case study and its participants allowed for feedback on the
categories, themes, and conclusions. His reality and meanings ensured the truth value
of the data.
As for external validity, there will be limited generalizability of the findings.
The intent of qualitative research is to form a unique interpretation of events
(Merriam, 1988). By its nature, the case study of this Agency is unique. There will
also be limitations in reliability or replication of the study due to its uniqueness.
However, allowing for the uniqueness, there may be opportunities for replicating the
approach utilized to study organizational change in other settings. A rich, thick,
detailed description will be used to communicate the events and outcomes and
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provide a clear and accurate picture o f what was done and the methods used. This
will provide opportunities for transferability. Additionally, the results will provide an
in-depth analysis of events in relation to the sensemaking model.
The Qualitative Narrative
This report is presented in a descriptive, narrative form. It will communicate a
holistic picture of the experiences of the Agency Director and his top management
team in implementing organizational change. This author then constructed his
experiences and interpretations of events. This was categorized in relation to the
sensemaking model and Weick’s (199S) theory/approach.
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CHAPTER n
RESTRUCTURING PROPOSAL
The 1990s: Background Information
In January 1991, a new Governor was elected. This new Governor, a
Republican, ran a campaign that promised to lower property taxes, to make state
government smaller in size and more accountable, and to make the state more
competitive in attracting new businesses to bolster what was then a sagging
economy.
Shortly after the election, the Agency Director resigned. This Agency
Director had been associated with the previous Democratic governor. Consequently,
the position of Agency Director was vacant and a process to fill that position was
undertaken.
The new Governor was interested in making basic changes in the way that
state government functioned. He was not interested in the status quo, and believed
that fundamental changes were necessary in order to make state government more
responsive to the people it served. He had the opportunity during his first few months
in office to appoint five of the seven members o f the Commission.
The Commission is a seven-member body appointed by the Governor, with
the consent o f the Senate. The Commission is the policy-making body for the
Agency. In addition to its policy-making role, the Commission is also responsible for
hiring and firing the Agency Director.

16

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17
The process o f choosing the new Agency Director occurred during the
summer of 1991. There were several strong candidates for the position. One
candidate was a 25-year veteran o f the Agency. He was considered by most
observers as a “long shot” candidate, and given little chance to be successful. Part o f
the reason for this was the fact that the responsibilities o f his Office were
administrative in nature, and were not considered as a major program area of the
Agency. Those responsibilities included recordkeeping o f all state-owned lands,
leasing of mineral rights, and land acquisition for the various program areas. Some
described him as the compromise candidate, to be chosen if none o f the stronger
contenders could be agreed upon by a majority of the Commission members.
One of the strengths of this compromise candidate was his strong
endorsement o f the concepts of total quality management in order to provide more
creative management of the Agency and to improve, streamline and create greater
efficiencies in the delivery of services provided by the Agency. Always interested in
looking at ways to do things better, he had become acquainted with the concepts of
total quality management through his personal and professional relationship with a
staff member o f the Federal Quality Institute. His endorsement of change within the
system to create what he called a more “user-friendly” Agency, combined with the
historical knowledge gained from his many years working within the organization,
made him an attractive candidate. He was chosen for the job.
The Agency Director’s contract, negotiated with the Commission, required
him to provide an effective organization and management system. In order to achieve
this objective, the Agency Director and his Leadership Team established the
Management Review Committee (Committee) in February, 1992. The Committee
consisted of ten individuals representing a cross-section of the Agency. This cross
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section included staff from each of the three Regions. It included staff from Regional,
District and Area offices, as well as central office staff, and the members represented
a variety of classification levels within the Agency. This author was designated as the
Chair of the Committee.
The Committee was given nine different charges to analyze and make
recommendations for consideration by the Agency Director and the Assistant
Directors. The Committee was given nine charges to address:
1. Analyze previous organizational studies of the Agency, and conduct a
comparative analysis of other organizations.
2. Describe and evaluate current Agency relationships with the public and
how they can be improved.
3. Evaluate current procedures for employees to determine if sufficient
guidance exists for effective performance.
4. What alternative models of management should top management consider?
5. What methods of program coordination are now in place, and how can they
be improved? Are structural changes called for?
6. What obstacles to effective program decision making and coordination now
exist, and how can these processes be improved and streamlined?
7. Review administrative support practices in the Agency and identify options
for improvement.
8. Explore the opportunities for providing public service through the “Service
Center” concept.
9. Present other ideas, issues or opportunities which the Committee feels are
priorities arising from the study.
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Several means were utilized to obtain the information. First, a list o f questions
was developed that addressed each o f the charges, and interviews were conducted
with all Assistant Directors and Office Chiefs in the Agency. Second, a series of 28
meetings were conducted in Agency offices throughout the state, with an estimated
400 employees participating. Third, an electronic mail system was utilized by
employees. Fourth, numerous one-on-one meetings were held. Fifth, surveys were
conducted of other similar public agencies and Canada. Sixth, an independent
facilitator conducted focus group sessions with 16 clientele groups in the following
four categories: (1) Environmental/Conservation, (2) Governmental, (3) Media, and
(4) Industry. Four separate sessions were conducted for each of these categories,
with multiple representatives attending within each category. The information
obtained through these various means provided the basis for the Committee’s report,
which was completed in August 1992.
One of the key recommendations in the report was that there should be no
structural changes in the organization of the Agency. The most significant
observations and recommendations were:
1. The Agency’s best and most important resources are its human resources.
2. The Agency must empower employees and encourage teamwork.
3. Support to Field operations in Field offices should be increased.
4. Authority for making routine decisions should be delegated to the lowest
possible level and unnecessary supervisory reviews should be eliminated.
5. All Offices should be directed to review their organizations to determine if
further decentralization of staff and decision-making is feasible.
6. The Agency should implement a program incorporating the concepts of
total quality management.
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7.

Matrix management should be utilized to cut across different levels o f

management and different units.
The report was submitted to the Agency Director and the Leadership Team,
who then reviewed the report to make final decisions regarding what
recommendations to implement, modify or reject. The Agency Director, who
campaigned for the Directorship promising changes in the Agency’s operations and
improvement o f its processes and performance, felt strongly that in addition to the
seven items mentioned above there needed to be structural change in the Agency. He
felt that structural change was a visible means of demonstrating that the organization
was going to be flattened and that decision-making chains would be shortened. While
the Management Review Committee (MRC) was asked to look at the organizational
structure to see if it could be improved, there was never any mandate from the
Agency Director that there would be such a change.
Specifically, the Agency Director’s proposal was to eliminate a layer of
management. That layer was the Regional Supervisor positions. This consisted of 45
mid-level management positions located in each of the three Regional Offices. These
positions represented their respective Offices and were responsible for coordinating
all Office activities within that respective Region. Each Office in the Agency had staff
based in the central office, as well as in the three Regional Offices and various other
District and Area offices throughout the state.
The goals of the Agency Director’s proposal were to: (a) empower staff at
the front lines to make decisions and promote further teamwork, (b) reduce
management positions and reinvest the savings into more front-line workers at lower
classification levels, (c) streamline communications by having field staff no further
than two steps away from their Office Chiefs office, and (d) flatten the supervisory
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hierarchy of the organization by eliminating management positions. These goals were
in concert with those o f the Management Review Committee, but were more specific
in terms of implementation of those concepts, and also went further by proposing the
actual reduction of management positions.
The Agency Director, through this proposal, would accomplish the goal of
overtly demonstrating a change in the Agency’s structure to signify a change in its
operation. This change could then be seen by the Governor and the Commission. He
also would be in concert with the other major recommendations of the Committee.
The functions of the Regional Supervisors would be taken over by teams o f
District Supervisors, who were the next lower management level in the Field. This
team concept would further promote the principles of total quality management, a
concept endorsed by the Committee and heartily endorsed by the Agency Director.
Elimination o f the Regional Supervisor layer of management did not receive
total endorsement by the Leadership Team, specifically the Regional Assistant
Directors. They argued that the Regional Supervisors performed valuable and key
functions. Specifically, they felt that the Regional Supervisors, because they were a
key link between the Field staff and the central office staff, would be in the best
position to help implement the concepts of total quality management and ensure that
decision-making was decentralized to the most appropriate level in the Field. The
Regional Assistant Directors further argued that elimination o f a layer of management
should not focus exclusively on the Field structure, but should target centralized staff
as well.
The Assistant Directors were split in terms of their support for the
restructuring concept. Extensive discussion within the Agency occurred over a
several month period o f time. Meetings were held with Office Chiefs, both
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individually and collectively, to explain the proposed change and to obtain their input
as to how they would make this new concept and approach work within their Office.
Most were not enthusiastic about the proposal, but did proceed to develop and
present their plans for implementation. The Agency Director, even given the internal
disagreement, remained firm in his resolve to eliminate the Regional Supervisor level
of management.
As a result o f these efforts to explain the proposal and obtain public input, the
Agency Director now had to assess the situation and determine what to do. His
Leadership Team, while trying to remain supportive, was divided in terms o f wanting
to proceed to implement the proposal. Assistant Directors with extensive experience
and years in the Agency were not inclined to want to make these changes. Those
Assistant Directors who were more recent arrivals in the Agency and did not have
that historical perspective were supportive of the direction that the Agency Director
wanted to pursue.
The Commission was, at this point in time, supportive of the concept.
However, there had been no detailed discussion or presentation of the proposal to the
Commission. There was growing criticism outside the Agency from various
stakeholder groups, legislators and individuals that the proposal was being developed
without adequate public participation and input. After an initial briefing to the
Commission, the Leadership Team agreed to conduct three public meetings in each of
the three Regions, and also met with legislators and key special interest groups.
Agency employees were kept informed through electronic mail and in meetings with
the Assistant Directors and Office Chiefs. The major comments received were:
(a) concerns expressed over rumors of office closures, layoffs, and disruptions in
affected communities; (b) a strong belief that the Governor was behind the effort to
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restructure, and a disbeliefthat the dollars saved would be allowed to be reinvested in
the redeployment of more personnel into the front lines; (c) a concern that there was
too much politics in the Agency; (d) statements that employee morale was low; (e) a
belief that eliminating Regional Supervisors is eliminating the “decision-makers”; and
(f) disbelief that the proposal decentralizes decision-making.
At this point in time, the Commission became split in terms of its support. It
appeared that three members were very supportive, three were against, and the
seventh member could go either way. The three members who were supportive held a
strong belief that their roles as Commissioners was one o f dealing with policy, and
that the Agency Director should be able to make internal management decisions
without interference from them. The three members opposed to the proposal had
various reasons for their points o f view. One Commissioner felt that the plan could
result in fewer staff in the area he represented, even though this was not the case.
Another Commissioner was not convinced that the organizational moves were
beneficial overall, and was under constant pressure from constituent groups to not
support the proposal. The third Commissioner wanted to implement the Management
Review Committee report, and pointed out that the report recommended no
structural changes in the organization. The seventh member of the Commission had
initially been supportive o f the proposal, but began to waver when the plan became
controversial. It was impossible to predict exactly how he might vote for the plan.
The Agency Director had publicly stated that he would not proceed to
implement the restructuring plan without the support o f the Commission. He could
see that his organizational proposal was becoming controversial among the
Commissioners, and that it was becoming more divisive.
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The Governor and his aides were supportive o f the concepts o f the
restructuring plan. The Governor even signed a letter indicating that any savings
achieved through the elimination o f positions could be utilized by the Agency in
creating additional positions to be redeployed to the front lines.
To summarize the situation, deep divisions were starting to surface within the
Agency, at staff levels as well as at the Office Chief and Assistant Director levels.
While there was vehement opposition from staff that would be directly impacted at
the Regional level, there was support from other levels o f management within the
Agency. Externally, the media coverage was negative, and the interest groups and
other stakeholders were nearly unanimously opposed to the restructuring proposal.
The Commission was split, and the best estimate was that the Agency Director could
probably obtain a 4-3 vote in favor o f the restructuring proposal. The Governor’s
Office remained supportive of the Agency Director’s proposed course of action.
The Agency Director decided that he did not want a split vote from the
Commission, but instead wanted to strike a compromise which could gain the support
of all seven members. He realized that the odds were that he could obtain a 4-3 vote
in favor of his plan, but was concerned that the rift that this would cause on the
Commission could jeopardize future efforts that he would want to undertake as
Agency Director. The Commissioners who were against the plan had serious
reservations about it being implemented. The level o f frustration and concern inside
and outside of the Agency could seriously affect his ability to lead. To this end, the
Agency Director directed his Chief of Staff to work with all of the Commissioners
and achieve a solution that could gain the support of each of them. In order to reach
that goal, it was necessary to withdraw from immediately eliminating the Regional
Supervisor layer o f management, which was the major point of contention. One of
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the major complaints was that the whole approach was a top-down mandate from
upper management.
At its April 1993 meeting, the Commission passed a resolution regarding
restructuring in the Agency. The main objectives and goals endorsed by the
resolution were: (a) creating a more efficient and effective service delivery system,
(b) making the Agency more responsive at the local level, (c) increasing staff and
resources dedicated to the field, (d) streamlining the chain of command for
decentralized decision making, and (e) empowering employees to make decisions at
the first interface with the public.
The agreement was that the Offices would each be asked to develop their
own individual plans for achieving the goals of the restructuring as stated earlier in
this paper.
In a memorandum to the Office Chiefs, the Agency Director conveyed the
Commission resolution and the guidelines for the preparation of the Office plans to
achieve the objectives of the resolution. In addition, he included a “Commentary” at
the end of the memorandum. He indicated that he remained firmly committed to the
belief that elimination of unnecessary supervisory/managerial positions would
streamline the chain of command. He said decentralizing decision-making would
enable and empower field employees to make more routine decisions on the “front
lines,” ultimately resulting in a more efficient and effective service delivery system.
The result would be more Agency personnel helping the public at the initial point o f
contact.
The Agency Director said that the Civil Service system imposes tremendous
constraints on management’s ability to enact changes without adversely affecting
employees. The negative impact on Agency employees, their families and various
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communities was too great to undertake significant restructuring and redeployment
initiatives immediately.
However, he indicated that the same “redeployment” goals that had become
an issue of intense debate could be accomplished gradually, by normal attrition.
Therefore, a “needs analysis” would be conducted, in coordination with Office
Chiefs, as every position became vacant. The goal o f getting more Agency employees
to the “front-lines” would take longer, but improvement in employee morale would
make the wait worthwhile.
The Agency Director further said that additional goals to be sought by
gradually eliminating unnecessary management positions would result in: (a) holding
potential Civil Service bumping and transfers resulting from restructuring to an
absolute minimum, (b) special attention to protecting workforce diversity
achievements, and (c) forming strong partnerships and cooperative efforts with all
concerned groups to increase funding for the Agency and its programs.
Office Chiefs would be directed to develop plans to implement the goals and
directives outlined, and implementation would be continually monitored, and Office
Chiefs would be further directed to engage in an ongoing procedure to identify
additional methods to improve services.
All Commissioners were in agreement that this was a better approach, and
that it incorporated the use of total quality management principles in achieving those
stated goals. The Commission was looking for a compromise position that would
reduce the friction and animosity that had developed, both internally and externally,
and would still allow the Agency Director to proceed on some aspects o f the
restructuring proposal.
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This was the blueprint under which the Agency proceeded from April 1993
until November 1994. At that time, the Agency Director, at the urging of key stafL
decided to embark upon a strategic planning initiative at the Leadership Team level.
An employee Quality Action Team (QAT) had been formed under the Continuous
Quality Improvement (CQI) program and had developed a strategic planning
approach for the Agency. This was to be the first step in the process laid out by that
QAT. Assistance in this effort was provided by university consultants.
One of the first steps taken was to have interviews conducted with individual
members o f the Leadership Team in order for each to identify strategic issues facing
the Agency, pinpoint key barriers to effective operation and decision making, and to
identify suggested courses of action.
Strategic issues which were identified included funding, information
technology, establishing a common vision for the Agency, ecosystem/watershed
management, privatization, improved stakeholder communication. These were
compared with strategic issues identified in the MRC report which included
improving the image of the Agency, considering alternative models o f management,
improving program coordination, reducing barriers to effective decision making, and
exploring a “service center” concept.
Next, a pareto analysis was developed based on the interviewees’ ratings on a
1 to 5 scale of written questions provided to them during the interviews. It analyzed
seven leadership dimensions. These dimensions and the total Leadership Team rating
for each on a 1 to 6 scale (I = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree) are presented in
Figure 2.
The interviews led to the identification by the consultants o f Leadership Team
barriers to effectiveness in the following areas.
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Total Group Ratings by Dimension
Leadership Team Feedback

Laariamhip Dtnwraian

Leadership Dimensions
Dim 1 - Common Vision and Understanding
Dim 4 - Conflict Resolution
Dim 2 - Problem-Solving
Dim 5 • Balanced Participation
Dim 3 - Decision-Malting
Dim 6 - Effective Meetings
Dim 7 - Communication

Figure 2. Pareto Analysis.
Common Vision
1. Vision and values differ across people.
2. Differences can become a constructive force but has lead to distrust.
3. The Agency’s mission is contradictory.
4. The Leadership Team is not operating under a common philosophy and
thus the focus is more on fighting fires than dealing proactively with issues.
5. Different levels o f understanding of the issues lead to inevitable conflict.
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Problem Solving
1. There is a need for more appreciation o f the complexity o f the issues.
2. The plate is full of unprioritized items that does not encourage a thorough
analysis of problems/issues.
3. Short-term solutions are made without thorough consideration of long
term consequences.
4. Micro-managing leads to more shallow processing o f issues that should
have higher priority.
Decision Making
1. Recommendations are not acted upon in a timely manner.
2. When decisions seem to be made, they may be reversed or rehashed.
3. Decisions are not seen as a team product but as individual products.
4. There is a lack of follow-through to make sure that decisions reached are
implemented.
5. The ambiguity of the decision process allows for retaining control and
flexibility.
Conflict Resolution
1. Opposing viewpoints are not solicited and often are refuted rather than
discussed.
2. A decision regarding the leadership role must be made in order to take
advantage of the Team’s diversity.
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3. Conflicts over micro-management issues are not worth the sacrifice of
being able to competently address key policy issues to set direction and tone.
4. Empowerment and responsibility are limited, especially around
controversial issues.
5. Instead of openly discussing concerns, the Team takes more o f a “wait it
out” or avoidance approach, and goes outside o f the meeting to meet individual
agendas.
Effective Meetings
1. Agendas are not set in advance and are not very informative.
2. Meetings do not stick to the agenda and move off on tangents or personal
agenda items.
3. There is no system to ensure a balance in the opportunity to share opinions.
4. There is no firm agreement on the next steps to take.
5. There are no minutes to structure what needs to occur at the next meeting.
6. There is a tendency for issues to come up again and again without
resolution.
Leadership Dilemmas
1. How much energy is there within the Leadership Team to address internal
team issues?
2. How much energy is there within the Leadership Team to develop a
strategic plan for the Agency?
3. What team issues must be addressed in order for the strategic planning
process to be successful?
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4. What team issues do not need to be addressed for the strategic planning
process to be successful?
The above is a snapshot o f the consultants’ summary o f the state o f the
Leadership Team at the end of 1994. It served as a starting point for discussions at
the first strategic planning session on January 19 and 20, 199S.
In order to address these issues, specific action steps were identified. They are
summarized as follows:
1. Action itemsfo r effective decision making: (a) develop team ground rules
for how the Leadership Team will operate as a team; (b) determine who is a part of
the decision making body in the Leadership Team; (c) identify types o f decisions that
can be made unilaterally, after consultation, by majority rules or must be made by
consensus; and (d) use more formal mechanisms for surfacing issues for decisions and
for determining final status of the issue (e.g. formal motions, recorded decisions).
2. Action itemsfo r making meetings more productive: (a) develop useful
agendas and minutes, (b) stay focused during meetings, (c) make decisions and set
policy instead of micro-managing, (d) hold everyone accountable for actions taken
after team meetings that do not support team decisions, and (e) increase time devoted
to analyzing future directions and issues facing the Agency.
3. Action items relating to problem solving: (a) prioritize issues and make
sure that efforts reflect priorities; (b) focus on short and long term consequences for
employees and stakeholders; (c) for complex issues, develop position statements that
provide both pros and cons to certain courses o f action; (d) explore alternative
perspectives and options; and (e) summarize positions/issues prior to decision
making.
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In addition to the above, that first strategic planning session reviewed the core
principles, and the pros and cons, o f doing strategic planning. An update and analysis
of the progress made on implementing the MRC report, a review and discussion o f
draft mission and vision statements, and consensus building on the strategic planning
process.
The next strategic planning session was conducted on May 25, 1995. The
meeting began with an overview by the Agency Director of changes that are
occurring in the Agency. The Agency Director highlighted the need to consolidate
field office locations, reduce programs, and eliminate the regional layer of
management. He indicated that this was necessary in order to achieve an anticipated
$3-5 million budget reduction, and that if the Agency did not develop such a plan,
one would be developed for it and imposed on the Agency. The Agency Director
indicated that he intended to eliminate the Regional structure and to reinvest the
savings toward automation.
This decision by the Agency Director to once again attempt to eliminate the
regional layer o f management was a complete surprise to the Leadership Team. It had
not been discussed with them prior to the meeting, and it brought back the unpleasant
prospect of revisiting this issue which had been unsuccessfully attempted during the
first effort at restructuring.
Direction for Strategic Planning
The direction that the Agency Director wanted to lead the Agency in
consisted of several components. He saw that there were numerous signs that
changes needed to occur within the Agency in order for it to remain effective given
social, economic, and political realities. Numerous presentations at the strategic
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planning meetings highlighted the need for such changes. Discussions focused on
short-term plans to meet shortfalls in revenues, as well as demonstrating that the
Agency was willing to change. Short-term issues included closing existing buildings
and critically examining existing programs for possible reduction in effort.
Discussions also focused on longer term issues regarding what the Agency
would look: like in 5 to 10 years. The long-term vision focused on implementing an
ecosystem approach to managing. Under this type o f an approach, the Agency would
be committed to the alignment, integration and removal of barriers so that
organizational operations would better match the Agency responsibilities. It calls for
an integrated approach to addressing issues and to develop innovative solutions. An
ecosystem approach was also consistent with the ongoing Continuous Quality
Improvement (CQI) initiative which encouraged teamwork and empowerment while
providing quality service to customers and stakeholders.
This movement towards an ecosystem approach utilizing the principles o f
CQI called for a move away from a regional structure with distinct offices to a
district structure with project teams and matrix management. It also called for
reevaluating the mix of field offices and locations to best accomplish the desired
goals. This meant a greater presence in the field to meet the needs o f the public and
to better focus decision making at the level most appropriate for those decisions
rather than decision making predominantly residing in the central office.
The Agency Director’s vision also highlighted the need to be aggressive in
harnessing the power of new technologies in order to assist staff in being better able
to communicate with one another and the public. This called for a workforce more
adaptive and flexible in meeting those needs. It also called for a greater commitment
to training and development.
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At the time o f the May 1995 strategic planning meeting described above, the
course o f action was to develop a plan for consolidation of field offices and a
reduction o f programs in the central office. The strategic planning process was
making good progress in the first step of identifying ways to consolidate resources to
better meet the future challenges facing the Agency. Data had been gathered that
generated knowledge and provided a basis for action. There seemed to be general
agreement within the Leadership Team on the need for change.
However, the focus o f the Leadership Team was on downsizing and cost
reduction as a key business strategy. While these were important, they were the only
visible aspects of the Agency change process involving ecosystems, empowerment,
teamwork, and continuous improvement. These words were seen as hiding the “real”
agenda of the Leadership Team, which was efficiency and cost reduction. This led to
decreasing staff morale and a high level of cynicism. These endeavors were viewed as
being done for political expediency rather than for the good o f the Agency.
It was important to also look at the fact that the downsizing and cost
reduction strategies could not be accomplished in a vacuum. Steps needed to be
taken for the issues of ecosystem management, teamwork, and empowerment to take
hold with the staff and stakeholders. The first step was to have a clear vision that
could be articulated regarding the future look o f the Agency. Pieces o f such a vision
were already in place to assist individuals in understanding the reasoning behind the
moves for consolidating offices and downsizing as being parts o f a larger strategy to
reinvent the Agency.
The second step was to put as much, if not more energy into the issue of
teamwork, team leaders, and empowerment as was put into the consolidation of
resources and buildings. In order for staff and stakeholders to believe that changes
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would take place, there had to be visible signs that the Agency was moving toward a
more team-based approach to examining issues and developing solutions.
Dictating that the regional supervisory roles were to be immediately
eliminated and replaced by a team leader without any planning or resolution as to
what the roles and responsibilities o f the team leader positions would be, or how a
full service office should look like and operate within a team concept was a recipe for
disaster. Many employees saw it as a heavy-handed approach which went against the
CQI principles of empowerment, teamwork, and quality service. Similarly, mandating
the consolidation of offices without the input of the office chiefs or other employees
was an approach that resulted in resistance. While involving people in the process
always takes time, it also has the potential of leading to innovative solutions to
complex issues.
The Agency Director had made it clear at the beginning o f the meeting that he
did not want the issues discussed at the meeting to leave the room, and that he did
not want to read about the discussions in the newspapers. So the Leadership Team
came out of the meeting needing to develop plans to: (a) define the roles and
responsibilities of the Regional Assitant Directors given the elimination of the
regional level of supervision, as well as those of the team leader positions to be
created; (b) determine program priorities and how the Agency would function
without the Regional level of management; (c) define Service Centers and how they
would function, be staffed, and the associated costs; (d) develop a mission and vision
statement; and (e) construct a message for employees, stakeholders, and the news
media.
The next meeting was July 19-20, 1995. Plans were developed by various
members of the Leadership Team to address items (a) through (e) above and were
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presented at the meeting. At this stage, there were significant concerns among some
members of the Leadership Team as to whether it was possible for the Agency
Director to lead the organization in this new direction. There was a lack o f
confidence in his leadership, as well as a lack o f confidence between various members
o f the Leadership Team.
After this meeting, several items had become very clear. The planning process
had led to a short-term, cost reduction and efficiency strategy developed to meet
perceived external pressures and demands. This approach ignored the longer-term
issues and strategies that would focus on improving the effectiveness o f the agency.
The approach taken was counter to the principles o f CQI that focused on taking a
systems approach to problems, involving key constituencies in the problem definition
and problem solving activities, and where leaders help eliminate barriers to success
for others.
A vision for where the Agency was going and how it was going to get there
had still not been crafted due to the short term crisis orientation. In effect, the focus
seemed to be on reactive planning and dealing with current issues.
The initial strategic planning meeting was largely successful in identifying key
issues facing the agency and in examining issues around the concept of ecosystem
management. Subsequent meetings did not build upon that momentum, but instead
focused on how to consolidate buildings and meet budget shortfalls. After the first
meeting, a new agenda was revealed at each subsequent meeting which changed the
direction and scope of the planning sessions.
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Summary o f Lessons Learned
Preplanning is a critical part o f success in strategic planning. The Agency
Director and his staff needed to be engaged in discussing and framing the issues off
line to prepare for the next strategic planning session. There are many issues to work
through and a careful planning of an agenda leads to greater confidence by a
leadership team that a systematic approach is being taken. There were many
compliments from the Leadership Team regarding how well organized and how well
run the first strategic planning meeting was. That was no accident. There were
numerous discussions completed prior to the session, an agenda was carefully crafted
through meetings off site, and the Agency Director and other members were actively
engaged and committed to the process. Between subsequent meetings, no offline
sessions were scheduled and the Agency Director became disengaged from the
process.
This situation is analagous to Goffinan’s contribution to dramaturgical theory
in describing how one presents oneself in everyday life. Goffinan, (1955, 1959) says
that each person has a “face” that he or she presents to other members of a group.
This “face” represents the person’s self-image and how they wish to be perceived by
others. Groups want to ensure that no one’s self-image is damaged or embarrassed,
and consequently establish norms to discourage that from occurring.
Dramaturgical analysis employs the concepts o f backstage and stage.
Backstage is where participants prepare for their roles. Stage is where the action
takes place in front o f the audience. In this case, the preplanning for the strategic
planning meetings was the backstage work, while the meetings themselves
represented the stage. After the initial meeting, there were attempts by the Leadership

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38
Team members to encourage the backstage activities, but they did not occur to any
significant extent.
Another issue was that an effective change effort can not occur when the
Agency Director mandates change, such as the elimination o f the regional supervisor
layer o f management, and then does not allow the Assistant Directors to work with
their own staff in order to determine how to accomplish the objective. The Agency
Director mandated that the Assistant Directors not involve others in the process of
consolidating offices and the associated issues surrounding such consolidation. This
was particularly difficult for the new Assistant Directors, who were in their first
weeks on the job. The opportunity for quality input from the staff to review and
refine such plans was lost, even though such input was essential for success. The
employees viewed this as another example of how the leadership o f the Agency was
not following the principles of CQI. The lack o f an attempt to build consensus led to
resistance by staff.
Additionally, trying to make significant decisions in a vacuum and keeping
discussions confidential was an invitation for rumors and backdoor politics to
emerge. Messages from the Agency Director over a period o f time could have laid
the groundwork for the types of changes being proposed. The constancy of such a
message could have led employees to be more accepting of the changes, even if they
did not totally agree with them. Instead, the approach taken would cause much
disruption in people’s lives and did not convey why the change was needed and how
it would better serve the Agency and the public. Employees felt strongly that the
Agency Director was responding or acquiescing to external demands, and was not
providing leadership for the Agency.
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One of the university consultants working with the Agency on the strategic
planning process observed that the strategic planning process was off the tracks. In
order to put the train back on the tracks, it would take reflection on what had gone
wrong, admission of mistakes, and a firm commitment to do strategic planning in a
systematic, and comprehensive way. He further indicated that there was commitment
to changing the Agency at the top, but little confidence that the current direction will
lead to a more effective Agency.
After the July meeting, the Agency Director closed the circle of staff he
confided in to two to three people. With this small group, he developed the Service
Center concept, and again proposed the reduction and elimination of regional
supervisors. Only at this late stage were the Office Chiefs able to convince the
Agency Director to give some flexibility on the timing of the eliminations in order to
mitigate the impacts of bumping, moves, and demotions on staff. At this point, a
feeling permeated the Leadership Team that the Agency Director was getting
desperate, and was going to be replaced. Shortly after this point in time, the
announcement of the split of the Agency was made by the Governor.
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CHAPTER m
LITERATURE REVIEW
Historical Roots
At a macro level, the field o f public administration begins with contributions
from a variety o f fields and disciplines. These include sociology, psychology, political
science, business administration, law and economics.
These various disciplines gave rise to the formative era o f public
administration, or the Orthodoxy era, which was characterized by practical
applications, efficiency, and an emphasis on scientific management, human relations,
and political reform. It lasted from the 1880s until the 1940s.
Criticism o f the orthodox approach by authors such as Gulick, Appleby,
Simon and Barnard began occurring in the late 1930s and into the 1940s and led to
two more broad schools o f thought. These were the political and behavioral schools.
Within the behavioral school resides organizational theory and behavior. Two of the
key organization theory books during this period of the late 1950s to the late 1960s
were March and Simon’s (1958) Organizations and Katz and Kahn’s (1966) Social
Psychology o f Organizations.
It is the work of the early 1960s in organization theory that began to focus on
decision making, conflict, change and leadership. And from this, organization
development bridged the descriptive theory to actual application (McCurdy, 1986).
This brief history is summarized in Figure 3:
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Figure 3. Brief History o f Public Administration Literature Relating to Organization
Development.
Organization Theory
Scott (1987) has looked at the various theoretical models of organizations
and has classified them. He suggests that the dominant model through the late 1930s
was the closed rational system. This model is typified by Taylor’s work on scientific
management. Scientific management assumes that goals are known, tasks are
repetitive, and that resources are uniformly available.
From an administrative theory standpoint, closed rational systems are typified
by the work of Fayol, Urwick, and Gulick, who emphasized the merits of
specialization and control. Weber’s (1924/1947) model o f bureaucracy imposed a
similar system of logic, where the human component is divorced from an individual’s
private life through the use of rules, salary, and career.
The second model that Scott (1987) identifies is the closed natural system
model. This model also concentrated its attention to the inside of the organization. It
keyed in on the emergence of informal structures and their impact on formal systems.
Key contributors from a human relations standpoint were Roy (1952) and Whyte
(1959). Barnard (1938) and Parsons (1960) contributed through the exploration of
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cooperative systems, and from a human relations standpoint the work o f Mayo
(194S) and Dalton (1959) was key. This theoretical model dominated from roughly
1930 to 1960.
These first two models were closed system models. The next two models fall
under the open system framework, where outcomes are strongly influenced by the
environment. The open system framework is found in the work o f Katz and Kahn
(1966).
The third type of model was the open rational system model. This model
dominated from approximately 1960 to 1970. March and Simon (1958) provided a
major contribution to this model through the concept of bounded rationality.
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) contributed the concepts and ideas o f contingency
theory, which recognized that varying environments posed different challenges for an
organization, and that organizations will adapt their structures to those environments.
Utilizing a combination of open and rational system assumptions is a strong
underlying theme in Thompson’s (1967) work. These authors dealt with how an
organization can function as a rational system, and yet still be open to the
uncertainties o f their environments. A significant amount of work was also done in
comparative structural analysis, and authors such as Udy (1959), Woodward (1965),
Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings (1969), and Blau (1970). Their work viewed the formal
structure of the organization as the dependent variable and worked to measure and
explain its characteristics.
In the mid-1970s Oliver Williamson (1975, 1981) contributes the concept of
transactions costs analysis. This focused concentration on the governing structures o f
organizations, rather than on commodities or services. Under this concept the
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structures of organizations are viewed as one important arrangement for establishing
and safeguarding transactions.
The fourth type o f model identified by Scott (1987) is the open natural system
model. This model has existed from around 1970 to the present. While not replacing
the open rational models, these new models do place a greater emphasis on the
importance of the environment and its effects on organizations, and it strongly
challenges the assumption that organizations are rational systems (Scott, 1987).
The open natural system models can be characterized by the work o f Weick
(1969) in relation to organizing, where he takes both an open and a natural view of
open systems. The work of Strauss, Schatzman, Ehrlich, Bucher, and Sabshin (1963)
on negotiated order emphasized that interactions in negotiations can transcend the
boundaries of organizations. The work o f March and Olsen (1976) regarding
ambiguity and choice emphasized that the context in which decisions are made
strongly influence the outcomes.
Miller and Rice (1967) looked at socio-technical systems in an effort to
discover how the larger organization is shaped by its needs to optimize the needs of
both the social and technical components o f an organization. Hickson, Hinings, Lee,
Schneck, and Pennings (1971) identified the strategic contingency approach, which
basically put forth the concept that organizations are coalitions, and that
organizational subunits may differ in their interests and act to reduce uncertainty
within the organization. Pfeffer (1978) argued that the structure of an organization
was the result of these various contests and struggles within the organization.
Weick (1995) indicates that organizations that are open systems should be
most concerned with sensemaking. Since they have a greater input from their
environment, there is more information to process. Open systems shift attention from
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structure to processes, and maintaining the processes can be problematic (Scott.
1987). Those problems become the focus of sensemaking, of balancing and managing
the internal and external processes.
Open systems have more ambiguity compared to rational or natural systems.
Sensemaking deals with what an organization or individual must be in order to
effectively deal with the internal and external environments. The distinctions made
between these two environments are the inventions of the people involved. The
results that occur become the focus for defining retrospectively what could have been
plausible inputs and throughputs.
Organizational Change
Lippitt (1993) discusses three models for organizational change. The first is
the equilibrium model, whose major goal is described as that of keeping the
organization free from conflict. The second model is the organic model, where the
emphasis is on team management and system problem-solving in order to increase
organization effectiveness. The third model is the development model which focuses
on the development o f relationships and interpersonal competence.
Lippitt (1993) describes the advantages and disadvantages of models, and
summarizes by indicating that change results from the manifestation o f power by key
individuals or groups who then seek assistance, engage in shared problem-solving
processes, support experimental attempts at change, and reward and reinforce
adoption of the desired new behavior patterns.
Dunphy and Stace (1993) indicate that there are two critical dimensions of
organizational change. The first is the scale or degree o f change, and the second is
the style of leadership required to implement that change.
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In regards to the scale o f change, the incrementalist viewpoint has been a
dominant model in the literature (Dunphy, 1981; Golembiewski, 1979a, 1979b;
Kanter, L983; Quinn, 1977, 1980). This viewpoint argues against radical change and
instead supports moving an organization in small, developmental steps. By doing so,
the organization has time to adjust to the changes being made in a progressive
manner. The case can also be made for radical change, which developed during the
1980s as a response to the major economic changes taking place on a global level.
The Agency’s restructuring proposal was, looking at the broad picture, an
incremental change. The number of positions being eliminated, which was 33, was
insignificant in relation to a staff o f over 3,000 employees. However, for many in the
organization it was viewed as a radical change. In comparison, the implementation of
the principles of total quality management was much less disruptive in the eyes of the
employees.
The second critical dimension of organizational change identified by Dunphy
and Stace (1993) is the style o f leadership. They identify four styles of change
leadership: collaborative, consultative, directive, and coercive.
The collaborative approach involves widespread participation by employees in
decisions regarding the organization’s future. The consultative style o f leadership
involves consulting with employees as to how to bring about organizational change.
The directive style of leadership involves using managerial authority as the main form
of decision making. And finally, the coercive style of leadership involves executives
and managers forcing change on key groups within the organization.
What is interesting is that throughout the course of the Agency’s
restructuring efforts, the leadership used all four types o f styles for change. The
collaborative approach was used early in the process, and was seen mainly through
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the use of the MRC and the input o f hundreds o f employees into the process of
determining the future course of the Agency. The consultative approach was used by
the Agency Director with the Leadership Team in terms of making decisions as to
how to proceed with the recommendations from the MRC. The Agency Director
rather rapidly evolved to using the directive approach, especially the decision to
eliminate the Regional Supervisor level of management. This directive approach over
time turned into a coercive approach with the Agency Director forcing the change,
with or without the support of the Leadership Team or others in the organization. At
this stage, he perceived his support as coming mainly from the Commission and the
Governor’s Office.
Resnick (1993) (CHT) identifies five conditions for change, while recognizing
that achieving all five conditions is rare. These five conditions for change are: (1) A
widespread need—the sense in the organization that a particular problem exists and
should be solved; (2) Leadership—the presence of a top administrator who is
motivated to work on a given change; (3) Trust—a climate of trust between and
among organizational members; (4) Resources—funds and expertise; (5) Positive
organizational history, especially with respect to change.
In looking at these five conditions, in the Agency there did not exist among
the staff a widespread need for the elimination o f the Regional Supervisor positions.
As has been indicated, the leadership, mainly the Agency Director, was motivated to
work on this given change. A climate of trust did not exist among organizational
members, and the trust between the leadership o f the organization and those affected
by the restructuring proposal deteriorated over time. Under resources, while funds
were not an issue, the expertise on the part of management to persuade and motivate
the change process was missing. And finally, the Agency did not have a positive
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organizational history with respect to change. As has been delineated, the Agency
was disillusioned and exhausted from the history of change efforts previously
undertaken. These previous efforts had resulted in a significant degree o f cynicism
regarding any structural change, and worked against securing support for this
particular organizational change effort.
Nadler (1993) describes three major areas that have been identified as being
critical to effectively managing organizational changes, along with an accompanying
12 action areas. The three major areas are: (1) shaping the political dynamics,
(2) motivating constructive behavior, and (3) managing the transition. The action
areas include such tasks as getting the support of key power groups, demonstrating
leadership support o f the change, rewarding desired behavior, communicating a clear
vision of the desired state, and obtaining feedback.
Nadler (1993) stresses that the senior managers o f an organization must
devote the time, effort and attention needed for successful change, and not delegate
those responsibilities or details. He indicates that this role is significant, and critical.
Resnick (1993) identifies three erroneous assumptions about organizational
change. One is that workers resist change, secondly that the planning o f change can
be kept separate from the implementation o f the change, and thirdly that change can
be managed effectively regardless of the organizational context.
He then discusses the five ideal conditions for change, which are identified as
(1) widespread need, (2) leadership, (3) trust, (4) resources, and (5) positive
organizational history. While recognizing that organizations will probably not exhibit
all five, each is still desirable.
Finally, Resnick (1993) lays out five principles for successful change:
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1. To change a unit, the relevant aspects of that unit’s environment must also
be changed.
2. To change behavior at any level in the organization, the levels above and
below must also exhibit complementary or reinforcing change.
3. Both the formal and informal organization must be considered in planning
change.
4. The effectiveness o f change is related to the degree in which members are
involved.
5. Change should be implemented where there is widespread dissatisfaction
among the workers.
Lewin (1951) wrote that successful change consists o f three stages. These
three stages are unfreezing, moving, and freezing.
The unfreezing stage consists of three steps. These are knowledge,
persuasion, and decision making (Rogers, 1983). Knowledge is necessary to make
one realize that there is a need for change and that change is possible. Persuasion is
encouraging individuals to adopt the change. Finally, decision making is the point at
which an individual decides whether to accept or reject the change. The decision to
either accept or reject a change is the result of the readiness of an individual. Schein
(1979) stresses the importance of readiness and indicates that no change will occur
without it. One can be influenced by one’s relationship with other individuals in an
organization in terms of reacting to a readiness message. Those who are respected as
opinion leaders can influence those needing to make the change. Therefore, these
opinion leaders can be critical agents of change to persuade others. The perceived
credibility and trustworthiness of these opinion leaders, if perceived positively, will
result in a more effective readiness message (Gist, 1987).
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In the Agency’s restructuring proposal there were multiple attempts to
promote the unfreezing o f staff. The readiness message consisted of the MRC report
and its recommendations, as well as numerous speeches and communications by the
Agency Director as to how the Agency needed to become more user-friendly, have a
more streamlined management structure, and taking an approach toward working
with former adversaries to resolve problems and issues. These efforts were perceived
more as a mandate from leadership rather than a co-opting approach to obtain buy-in
from staff. However, there was not enough effort put into identifying the key opinion
leaders in the Agency and convincing them o f the need for these changes.
Instead, individuals were allowed to pay more attention to the negative
outcomes o f the restructuring proposal, namely the elimination o f the Regional
Supervisor positions. Many of the staff in the Agency, including the Regional
Supervisors, naturally reacted negatively and defensively to a proposal that in their
view would directly impact them in a negative way.
The second stage of change, after unfreezing, is the moving stage. If the
unfreezing stage has not been successful, the most likely outcome is that the
proposed change will be rejected, and those who the change is targeted toward may
initiate negative reactions, such as sabotage. It appeared that the Agency, through the
restructuring proposal, ended up with a modified moving stage. While there was a
degree o f openness and receptiveness to the implementation o f the principles o f total
quality management, and a more moderate and creative approach in dealing with the
Agency’s stakeholders was preferable, there was a much lesser degree o f support for
the key structural changes proposed in the plan.
The third stage o f change is the freezing stage, which consists of confirmation
and institutionalization (Rogers, 1983). It is at this stage that it becomes apparent
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that the change has been made. Rogers goes further to indicate that even if
commitment has been developed and the change implemented there must be a
continuing effort to ensure that the adopted changes are not reversed. “Individuals
who are highly respected influence the willingness of individuals to change and to
institutionalize the change” (Armenakis & Feild, 1993, p. 417). The staff of the
Agency in the field who were the least convinced of the proposed structural changes
were able to read the reactions o f their Office Chiefs and some o f the Assistant
Directors, and realized that those individuals were not supportive o f the changes.
This carried a significant impact and weight with them in terms o f their reactions. It
also led some of them to think that perhaps the restructuring proposal would be
changed or modified by upper management to lessen any impacts, and further left the
impression that the Agency Director alone was promoting the changes.
The Leadership Team did not take a systematic approach to evaluating where
the Agency was at during each of these three phases of change in the proposed
restructuring. While most, if not all, members o f the Leadership Team were aware
that there was not significant support for the course of action being pursued, the
insistence of the Agency Director that the plan be adopted did not allow for the full
expression of the concerns, nor the exploration o f other alternatives to accomplish
the goal.
Leadership
The literature talks of modernist and postmodernist organizations. The
modernist approach worked well when organizations focused primarily on mass
manufacturing of goods. The principles of modernist organizations can be connected
to the works of Max Weber and Fredrick Taylor (Kuhnert, 1993). Fundamental to
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modernist organizations are the notions that there exists an ideal structure, that
success is based on simplified and efficient work, and that there is one best way to
organize, plan, and perform work.
Weber contributed the concept of an “ideal bureaucracy” (Bendix, 1962). In
such an organization there are strict procedures, decisions are based on knowledge
and facts, authority is limited, and power derives from one’s position. The term
rational organizations has been used to describe organizations with these kinds o f
traits.
Postmodernist thinking indicates that decision making is based predominantly
on values, emotions, and preferences, and much less so on logical or empirical
considerations (Etzioni, 1988). Further, it indicates that decision making does not
take place in isolation, and that leaders are not the only ones responsible for
successful goal attainment.
Fredrick Taylor introduced scientific management and believed that there was
one best way to organize. He believed that the scientific method would identify the
single best approach to production, organization, and management (Wren, 1987).
Postmodernist organizations tend to be less bureaucratic and more flexible in
their structure. An excellent example of postmodernist thought within current
organizations is the widespread use of total quality management (Garvin, 1988).
TQM emphasizes horizontal structures over vertical ones, takes into account the total
environment in which the organization operates, and focuses on interactions among
customers.
The study of leadership among modernist organizations focused on the effects
of leadership, rather than the process (Landy, 1989). In postmodernism there is a
need for postmodern theories o f leadership. Kuhnert (1993) maintains that the theory
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and research relating to leadership is in a state o f stuckness, and attempts to develop
a course for future organizational leadership research. He says that postmodernism
implies that new problems require new solutions, and that the modernist paradigm of
organizations, represented by the likes o f Weber and Taylor, no longer is adequate
and must be replaced. For example, instead o f strict rationality in decision making,
postmodern thought would allow for nonrational and nonauthoritative bases for
making decisions. Postmodernist organizations tend to be less bureaucratic and more
flexible in their structure.
Kuhnert (1993) identifies five propositions to guide the postmodern study of
leadership:
1. Rational leadership models must be complemented with nonrational
models. What this says is that leadership theory must go beyond the organizational
chart, and leaders need to be studied regardless of what formal position they hold in
the organization. Weber (1924/1947) recognized that there could be charismatic
leadership, based on the personal qualities o f the leader and not based simply on
position. The distinction between rational and nonrational approaches to the study of
leadership is now carried forward under the terms transactional versus
transformational leadership (Bass, 1985; Bums, 1978).
2. Leadership is fundamentally about human values. Some suggest that the
postmodern study of leadership should pursue focusing on personal values and
emotions o f leaders, as opposed to their skills and task performance (Fisher &
Torbert, 1991; Russell & Kuhnert, 1992).
3. Searching for a single cause, or a single model o f leadership does more
harm than good. Marshall Sashldn (1989) suggests that leadership theory should
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focus on the leader’s personal characteristics, behaviors, and situation
simultaneously.
4. Research methods must rely on synthesis as opposed to analysis. Miller and
Mintzberg (1983) propose three properties o f synthesis when advancing postmodern
leadership theory. The first is to study a large number of attributes simultaneously in
order to gain a more detailed and integrated picture o f the organization. The second
is to have research techniques take account of both time and process. One benefit is
the ability to reveal long-term impacts o f leadership in organizations. The third
property is to concentrate on synthesis which identifies larger patterns within the
existing data.
5. The objects of study must include the observable, as well as the
representational or symbolic.
This brief summary o f the major components o f postmodernist leadership
theory provides a sound basis for the utilization of Weick’s (1995) sensemaking in
order to understand the attempts at organizational change and restructuring in the
Agency.
Alan Bryman (1996) identifies four approaches to the study of leadership. The
trait approach was the major focus of study until the late 1940s. The style approach
predominated from then until the late 1960s. The contingency approach existed from
the late 1960s until the early 1980s. Finally, the New Leadership approach has been
the major influence since the early 1980s.
The emphasis of the trait approach was to identify the personal characteristics
and qualities of leaders. The style approach focused on the behavior o f leaders. The
contingency approach focused on the situational factors facing leadership. And
finally, the New Leadership approach encompasses a number of approaches to the
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study o f leadership. Authors utilize terms such as transformational leadership (Bass,
1985; Tichy & Devanna, 1986), charismatic leadership (Conger, 1989), visionary
leadership (Sashldn, 1988; Westley & Mintzberg, 1989), and leadership (Bennis &
Nanus, 1985; Kotter, 1990).
Organizational Culture and Leadership
Schein discusses organizations and how leadership operates in those that are
mature. He indicates that if the organization has not adapted to its environmental
realities, that in order to change its culture it must be led by someone who can realize
what changes are necessary and knows how to gain acceptance of those changes.
Leaders of mature organizations must find many ways to be exposed to their external
environment (Schein, 1992). Leaders who have the capability of managing such a
change can come from inside the organization, but the ability to be objective is
probably related to having a nonconventional career (Kotter & Heskett, 1992).
The Agency Director fit this description in terms of being a leader who had
risen from within the ranks of the Agency. He also had, and cultivated, extensive
exposure to the external environment o f the Agency.
Schein (1992) also says that the design o f the organization “elicits high
degrees of passion but not too much clear logic.” He also states that the structure of
an organization and its effectiveness can usually be interpreted in a number of
different ways by employees. The Agency Director concentrated on changing the
structure of the organization, and he felt very passionate about it. In contrast, a
majority of the employees did not understand why that structure needed to change,
and did not see the logic or the need for the change.
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Sensemaking
The course which has been charted through the literature leads to the current
literature regarding the subject o f organizational change. One of the key areas is that
of sensemaking, an approach currently being promoted by Weick (1995).
Sensemaking is defined as the act o f placing stimuli into some kind o f framework, a
thinking process that uses retrospective accounts to explain surprises. There is no one
definition. As we move from rational, to natural, to open systems, we also move from
structures, processes, and environments which are less ambiguous to those that are
more so. Sensemaking becomes more important as the ambiguity increases.
In the current environments in which public administrators function, the
common element is that there is an ever increasing rate o f change in terms of the way
things are done, in the technology available, and in the expectations o f the customers
of the organization. Under such conditions, there is a need for approaches that are
flexible in assisting to explain, or make sense, of what is happening. Sensemaking is a
current method that might take organization and leadership theory to a new plateau
and provide a mechanism for coping and adapting, both organizationally and
personally.
Culture
Organizational culture means different things to different people. The
literature reflects a variety o f assumptions about the topic, and it fails to clarify or
promote understanding.
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Organizational culture is a means o f instilling social order within an
organization. Organizational cultures are also susceptible to manipulation (Aldrich,
1992; Fineman, 1993; Pfeffer, 1982).
Managers who are skilled in the elicitation of emotion may be able to
crystallize employee feelings through their actions and their words.
If the culture of an organization is strong enough, it leaves little room for
those who don't believe in that culture or doubt it. The strong culture o f the Agency
had as one o f its major tenets the collective desire of a majority of staff to protect the
environment. This went beyond executing the normal job duties, and was a value that
many held high from a personal standpoint as well. Many o f the employees in the
Agency were hired in the 1970s and early 1980s, when the environmental movement
was a major force. From an environmental standpoint the traditional, and successful
approach to environmental protection that was supported by the Agency and utilized
by staff was to strongly react to individuals or companies that polluted the
environment. In many cases the approach used was to impose fines, take legal action,
or both, in order to ensure compliance with the law. This approach and its success
became a central part of the culture o f the Agency.
Some studies focus on the organization adapting to changing environmental
pressures and conditions (Akin & Hopelain, 1987; Nichols, 1985; Roskin, 1986).
This certainly was one aspect of what was happening to the Agency. The external
pressures from the Legislature, the Governor’s Office, and the Commission were
telling the Agency that it needed to change its approach in dealing with the public and
the business community.
Roskin (1986) refers to organizational culture as the organization’s
“autonomic nervous system.” Schein (1984) refers to culture as a pattern o f
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assumptions that a group develops in learning to cope externally and internally, and
that have worked well enough to be considered valid and appropriate.
Culture is comprised of values, beliefs, ideologies, attitudes and artifacts.
Shared values are important components o f the culture o f an organization (Alvesson,
1987). Each individual ranks values in his own hierarchy (Ravlin & Meglino, 1987).
Over time, we become so used to our values that we are not consciously aware of
their existence (Gagliardi, 1986).
One approach to culture is value engineering and its relation to the integration
perspective. The argument was that an effective leader could create the culture and
build it around those values that the leader espoused. This is what Peters and
Waterman (1982) emphasized. Similar ideas were put forward in other publications
(e.g., Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Ouchi, 1981; Pascale & Athos, 1981). The integration
perspective has been well described by Schein (1985), Barley (1983), Pettigrew
(1979).
Another distinction that can be made is that between “espoused “values
(Argyris, 1982) and “inferred” values (Siehl, Ledford, Sivermann, & Fay, 1988). The
difference is that espoused values are what an individual overtly states. Inferred
values are attributed to an individual to explain their behavior. In the Agency, what
the Agency Director and Leadership Team espoused was that they valued
participative management, total quality management principles, and that the
employees were the Agency’s greatest asset. However, for many of the staff, the
restructuring proposal led them to infer that since positions were being eliminated
without what they thought was a good rationale, there were other values at play.
The differentiation approach showed that there could be subcultures within an
organization. One argument is that cultural change when dealing with various
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subcultures within an organization tends to be incremental and changes are brought
about from the organization’s environment (e.g., Meyerson & Martin, 1987).
Culture change in organizations occurs due to the exploration o f different
approaches to resolving problems (Gagliardi, 1986). Gagliardi identifies two types of
culture change. First is cultural incrementalism, in which new values which do not
challenge the current cultural elements are incorporated. The second is cultural
revolution, which occurs when new cultural elements must replace existing ones.
Schein (1983) identifies what he calls “hybrid” managers, who are capable o f
observing the old culture while at the same time adding new elements that may be
dictated by changing circumstances. The effectiveness of these managers comes from
the fact that they are members of the culture undergoing the change and are sensitive
to it.
In this study the Agency Director was positioned to have the opportunity to
become a hybrid manager. His many years of experience working within the Agency
made him be perceived as part of the existing culture. However, through the course
of the MRC report and the subsequent restructuring proposals, he was unable to
achieve being a hybrid manager, and was viewed by many as a threat to the existing
culture.
Schein has written that an even essential function of leadership is the
managing and guidance o f the culture (Schein, 1985). Schein indicates that the
founders of new organizations often leave a distinctive culture on those
organizations. At later stages in the development o f organizations those distinctive
cultures may come to be viewed as liabilities.
Trice and Beyer (1990, 1993) write of innovation taking place when a new
leader tries to replace an existing culture. In effect, this is what the Agency Director
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was attempting to do through the restructuring proposal. He felt that the direction
that the Governor and the Commission was promoting was a more pro-business
approach. This approach was designed to take a more proactive stance on the part o f
the Agency to seek negotiation and consensus in resolving environmental matters, as
opposed to using a command and control approach that has been previously
described.
Martin (1992) elaborates different approaches to reading cultures within an
organization. One of the perspectives that she talks about is called the differentiation
perspective. In this perspective, culture is seen as being infused by a lack of
consensus. Therefore, when one looks at leadership within this perspective, it leads to
examining leadership being exercised by groups. Various groups within an
organization utilize informal leadership to express or promote their cultural positions.
These individual, group leaders are most likely instrumental in the leadership o f the
organization. This is a good description o f the culture of the Agency. There were a
number of informal leaders in the organization. In some cases these leaders occupied
formal positions, such as Assistant Directors or Office Chiefs. In other instances,
such as with the Regional Assistant Directors, a strong orientation had developed in
the field which viewed the leadership of the field as distinct from that of the central
office.
Martin (1992) also identifies what she terms the fragmentation perspective of
organizational culture. This perspective almost eliminates the role o f leadership in
organizational culture, and says that the culture is unclear and confusing to members
of the organization. In this fragmentation perspective, leaders can sometimes be
viewed as a source of ambiguity. I believe this is what happened in the Agency. The
Agency Director was attempting to forge a new direction and new approach for the
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Agency in how it conducted its business. This new, more user-friendly approach to
resolving issues ran up against an existing culture that did not necessarily value that
approach. Therefore, the new approach and the existing culture collided.
It can be argued that staff in an organization are not passive in terms o f how
they perceive or react to cultural change, but are imaginative consumers of the
culture (Hatch, 1993; Linstead & Grafton-Small, 1992).
Roskin (1986) discusses the key role o f leadership in managing corporate
culture. This key role is to allow cultural deviance to exist. Permitting this to exist, if
managed correctly, assists in moving toward new components o f the culture. In this
study, it appears that the Agency Director did not convince enough members o f the
Leadership Team or staff that the new, more user-friendly approach to managing the
Agency’s programs, was appropriate.
Transformational leadership offers a means for managers to explain their
visions and raise the expectations of staff (Bass, 1990). This type o f leadership calls
for a charismatic approach, mutual respect between the leader and staff, and a
recognition of the needs of the staff. The Agency Director was not able to establish
the basis for a transformational leadership approach to culture change.
Schein (1984) has identified three stages in the cultural life of an organization.
In the third stage an organization is considered mature, and finds that its culture can
prevent it from adapting to changing environmental conditions. Schein argues that
under these circumstances cultural revolution, as opposed to cultural incrementalism,
may be necessary. I believe that this is what the Agency Director was attempting to
accomplish through the restructuring proposals. He believed that taking an
incremental approach over time would not be effective in achieving the results he
desired. Not being able to convince a majority of the Leadership Team that this was
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the appropriate approach was a major factor in the lack o f success for restructuring.
This was further compounded by the Agency Director’s impatience to proceed on
this course as rapidly as possible. By not taking the time to bring staff along, to
explain, and to engage in discussions and argument and provide rationale, the major
elements necessary to change staff s opinions were missing.
The literature discusses how the concepts o f organizational culture can be
confused with that of the climate o f an organization. The climate refers to how well
employee expectations are being met, and is concerned with factors such as morale
and motivation (Nave, 1986). The organizational climate, dealing with the
perceptions and feelings of employees, is a more observable phenomenon. It was very
apparent to most members of the Leadership Team that the organizational climate
was negative, as a result of the actions of the Leadership Team and the restructuring
proposal. What is interesting is that the organizational climate can be governed
(Cullen, Victor, & Stephens, 1989; Golembiewski & Carrigan, 1970a, 1970b; Schein,
1986; Young & Smith, 1988). Yet the Agency Director elected not to meet with the
Office Chiefs at critical points in the restructuring process, and seldom spoke directly
with staff. One explanation as to why this occurred is because of his
uncomfortableness in directly communicating with these individuals, and further that
this uneasiness stemmed from his incomplete conviction in the course that he was
taking.
Bibeault (1982) has written that most companies that manage successful
turnarounds replace the individuals who are in key positions in the organization. This
was an approach that the Agency Director used in the initial stages o f his leadership.
While not having the flexibility to hire or fire at will, he did utilize the flexibility that
he did possess in order to move Assistant Directors into different Assistant Director
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positions. Additionally, his clear indication o f the direction in which he intended to
take the Agency resulted in one Assistant Director deciding to retire.
The literature relating to culture also points out that there are differences in
values and other components of culture between various hierarchical levels within an
organization (Posner, Kouzes, & Schmidt, 1985). The assumptions and values held
by employees at varying levels differ due to the differences in responsibilities. As an
example, it is suggested that as people move up the corporate ladder, they shift from
a more narrow focus to a broader perspective (Kovach, 1986).
Schein (1986) writes that conflicts between groups in an organization may
assist each in building and maintaining their own cultures.
There certainly were two distinct cultures when looking at the Agency from a
broad perspective. The environmental protection side of the Agency was very distinct
from the resource management side o f the Agency. As was explained in the earlier
history of the Agency, the environmental protection responsibilities were transferred
to the Agency in the early 1970s. The resource management responsibilities o f the
Agency had existed within it since its inception. This marriage o f two distinct cultures
into one Agency was never fully consummated in terms of merging the cultures. In
spite o f the intervening 20+ years, there never was a fell integration of those two
cultures into one. The idea that different parts of an organization can have different
cultures is supported in the literature (Louis, 1983; Wilkins & Patterson, 1985).
Gagliardi (1986) discusses how an organization attempts to maintain its
cultural identity through its prevailing values. But when the culture must change,
Gagliardi says it does so in two basic ways: (I) Cultural incrementalism—
incorporation of new values without challenging current cultural elements, and
(2) Cultural revolution—change requiring the abandonment o f current cultural
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elements because they must be replaced by the new ones. The scope for effective
leadership under these different circumstances was analyzed.
This article will be interesting to my study because it emphasizes the
important role o f the leadership in implementing cultural change, and provides the
beginnings of a framework for analyzing the actions taken in the Agency.
Allen and Kraft (1984) have identified a model for changing an organization’s
culture. They call it the Normative Systems Approach, and it consists of four phases:
discovery, involving people, bringing about change, and evaluating. Their first phase
is discovery. I believe that a comparison can be made between this phase and the
establishment o f the Management Review Committee to study the nine charges
presented by the Leadership Team.
The second phase of the Normative Systems Approach is the involvement o f
people. Again, an analogy can be drawn between this phase and the involvement of
staff in providing input for the MRC report. Over 400 staff were directly involved in
providing input on a variety o f issues for that report.
The third phase is actually bringing about the desired change. This phase
emphasizes four key elements: individual development; work team development;
leadership development; and the development o f policies, programs, and procedures.
It is at this phase that the restructuring proposal encountered mixed results. While
positive developments began to take place in the area of Continuous Quality
Improvement (CQI), which addressed individual and work team and leadership
development, these positive aspects were overshadowed by the effort to restructure
the Agency and eliminate the Regional Supervisor level of management. One o f the
reasons that this overshadowing occurred was due to the fact that elimination o f
those positions was not grounded in the analysis and recommendations of the MRC
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report, which employees were familiar with. In fact, that report specifically stated that
no structural changes were needed.
Allen and Kraft (1984) identify key principles for successful cultural change.
These key principles include: (a) involving staff in problems affecting them;
(b) refraining from blaming people; (c) working from a sound data base; and
(d) having clarity of goals, objectives, and purposes. Conversely, these principles are
impeded by: (a) looking for simplistic solutions, (b) blaming others, (c) leaving it up
to others, and (d) trying to do it by one’s self without involving others (Allen &
Kraft, 1984).
The restructuring proposal and the approach adopted by the Agency Director
and the Leadership Team in implementing it, highlights some of these guidelines and
principles and how they can be impeded. The concentration of effort on the Regional
Supervisor positions and their elimination was a simplistic approach. There were not
enough people at various levels in the organization involved in this decision in order
to generate the necessary support for its implementation. Instead, this approach was
mandated by the Agency Director, and did not have the foil support o f key members
of the Leadership Team. This major gap was further exacerbated by the fact those
very Assistant Directors who did not support the approach were being asked to take
the lead role in its implementation.
Denhardt (1993) talks about the involvement o f a manager in setting a new
direction for an organization. He says:
That intervention may be small and seemingly inconsequential, but to the
surprise of all concerned, it may make an enormous difference in the
organization. On the other hand, the action taken may be dramatic and appear
to address great issues, yet do little to affect the course of the organization’s
development, (p. 25)
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The restructuring undertaken by the Agency Director and the Leadership Team fits
into this latter category identified by Denhardt. While certainly significant in its scale,
it did not have a lasting effect on the development o f the organization.
Denhardt (1993) also discusses how major policy statements by a top
manager may be perceived either positively or negatively, by whether it answers
questions that the employees may have. He says:
The manager may be attempting to say something that will make a significant
difference in the way people in the organization behave, but if he or she acts
without consulting the employees and consequently fails to address issues
members o f the organization feel are most critical, if the manager fails to use
the right language so that the policy statement makes sense to those in the
organization, or if the manager fails to lead in a direction that seems both
reasonable and appropriate, there will be little positive effect and often quite
negative results, (p. 26)
The failure o f the Agency Director and the Leadership Team to convince the
majority of staff that the restructuring proposal was appropriate, and that it made
sense, was a major problem in its implementation. It significantly contributed to the
internal dissension, and subsequently led to the lack of support from key constituency
and stakeholder groups.
Denhardt (1993) discusses how a manager must model the appropriate
behavior desired in order for the organization to witness that behavior and, hopefully,
model it. He indicates that this type o f modeling applies to numerous areas o f
organizational life. The Agency Director’s behavior regarding the utilization o f the
principles of total quality management was closely watched by staff. The general
opinion developed by staff was that the Agency Director, and the Leadership Team,
did not practice what they preached in this regard. As an example, while participative
management was espoused, staff viewed the restructuring proposal and its details as a
major decision that did not take their concerns into account. It is my belief that once
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this opinion began to form, it then perpetuated itself Staff then concentrated on
decisions that fit those expectations, and put less emphasis on those decisions which
supported participative management. Cooper (1990) further confirms this by stating
that if a leader verbally encourages one type o f behavior, but exhibits another, the
staff will pay attention to the exceptions rather than what is being said.
Cohen and Brand (1993) indicate that the culture of an organization is
important when considering the organization’s capacity for adapting itself to TQM.
They say, “In general, organizations and people resist change when they have some
type of investment in particular work patterns or organizational arrangements, and
this resistance is like to increase at a rate proportional to that investment” (p. 68).
The perception by staff that there was not a good rationale for the
restructuring proposal led them to resist that change. In their minds it further
consolidated their feelings that the existing structure and approach did not need to
change.
Cohen and Brand (1993) also say, “People in organizations also learn through
social modeling—imitating the behavior of other people in the organization who are
successful or hold high status. This concept can work to a manager’s advantage when
attempting to change behavior” (p. 69). In the case o f the Agency, this did not work
to the Agency Director’s advantage. As indicated, many staff took their cues from
other members o f the Leadership Team who were not supporting the restructuring
proposal.
Mitroff (1983) says that the concept o f organization culture is a “sticky and
elusive one” (p. 120). Weick (199S) discusses how it is difficult to achieve shared
meaning within an organizational culture. He indicates that while people may not
share the same meaning, they do share the same experience. In the Agency, many
I
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staff had already experienced other restructuring efforts in prior years. It is my
opinion that these previous efforts had caused staff to be somewhat immune from
thinking that any major change or improvement could come from restructuring.
The Culture o f the Public Agency
In March, 1992, an analysis o f the organizational culture o f the Agency was
summarized by Professor Ralph C. Chandler o f Western Michigan University
(Chandler, 1992). His conclusions were the result o f individual sessions with
approximately 400 mid-level managers as part of the agency’s organizational
development program, as well as his contact with an additional 300 employees in
courses taught at the Masters and Doctoral level. Professor Chandler also was part of
Agency-sponsored secretarial and leadership academies, and also worked closely with
the Agency Director and the Leadership Team.
His organizational and personal analyses was based on the use of the various
diagnostic instruments: (a) The Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation—
Behavior (FIRO-B), (b) The Styles of Management Inventory (Managerial Grid),
(c) The Personnel Relations Survey (Johari Window), (d) The Management
Transactions Audit (Transactional Analysis Profile), (e) The Desert Survival
Situation, and (f) The Subarctic Survival Situation.
The Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation—Behavior
The FIRO-B measures expressed and wanted behavior in the areas of
inclusion, control, and affection. The scales used indicate degrees of personal
sociability, privacy, power, independence, generosity, and stability. The six cells are
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grouped as follows with numbers from 0 to 9 being assigned to each cell based on the
respondents answers to 54 questions (see Table 2).
Table 2
Model of FIRO-B Measures
Inclusion

Control

Affection

Expressed Behavior

Sociability

Power

Generosity

Wanted Behavior

Privacy

Independence

Stability

Expressed inclusion, which looks at the sociability scale, indicates the degree
to which we let others know that we want to be included in their activities. Wanted
inclusion, which looks at the privacy scale, shows how much we really mean the
degree of inclusion that we express. For example, our entire inclusion need may be
met simply by being invited. Once others have indicated to us that we are okay, we
prefer to be alone. Expressed control is our power scale, suggesting the degree to
which we want to control others. Wanted control is our independence scale, or the
degree to which we will allow others to control us. Expressed affection, which looks
at the generosity scale, shows how much love, warmth, and acceptance we typically
communicate to others. Wanted affection, which looks at the stability scale, indicates
how much affection we want others to show us, and how manipulative we might be
in getting what we want.
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The Styles of Management Inventory
The Managerial Grid locates individuals in reference to their relative concern
for people and production. The model in Figure 4 summarizes the conceptual
framework o f the grid.
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Figure 4. Model o f the Managerial Grid.
Those who fall in the 1/1 quadrant show a low concern for people and a low
concern for production. These managers are not necessarily bad managers since they
may have developed a compensation system for their natural predisposition not to
manage. However, a disproportionate amount o f emotional energy would probably
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be expended pursuing the compensation system. Managers falling into the 9/1
category, which is the authoritarian style, demonstrate a low concern for people and a
high concern for production. Managers in the 1/9 region, the humanitarian style,
display a high concern for people and a low concern for production. The preferred
quadrant is the 9/9, which indicates an effective manager who integrates a high
concern for people with a high concern for production. The 5/5 contingency manager
borrows from each o f the four quadrants o f the grid and utilizes each o f the other
typologies as the situation demands. The strength of the S/S style is that it can tailor
its management techniques to the personalities and time frame it is dealing with. Its
weakness is that it is unpredictable, even to itself, and generates a degree of anxiety
and some distrust among those being managed.
The Managerial Grid establishes a person’s preferred management style, and
it also rank orders one’s backup styles with the degree o f likelihood the manager will
fall back to the backup styles if the preferred one is unsuccessful. The respondents
also provide data that are broken down into component scores classifying them in
terms of philosophy of management and attitudes toward planning and goal setting,
implementation, and evaluation.
Th.e Personnel Relations Survey

The Johari Window assesses the understanding and behavior o f managers in
their control of the flow o f information between themselves and others. It measures
the extent to which they facilitate or hinder information flow between themselves and
three categories of others: employees, colleagues, and supervisors. It is a group
dynamics model employing a four-part figure (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Model of the Personnel Relations Survey.
The square field represents interpersonal space partitioned into four regions
with each region representing particular information-processing elements that have
significance for the quality o f relationships. The size and shape of each region,
revealed by how the respondent answers carefully worded questions, indicate
whether what is known by the self is also known by others (a large arena), whether
what is known by others is unknown by the self (a large blind spot), whether what is
known by the self is unknown by others (a large facade), or whether what is unknown
by the self is also unknown by others (a large unknown). Corrective activities for
dysfunctional informational flow are shown as feedback and exposure processes.
The Management Transactions Audit
The Transactional Analysis Profile provides data about the effects o f a
manager’s feelings and subsequent practices in responding to the comments o f others.
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As in the Johari Window, the responses are divided into three categories:
subordinates, colleagues, and superiors. The interpersonal transaction that occurs in
any kind o f contact, successful or unsuccessful, is “photographed” in the instrument.
The model’s assumption is that each person is a total system operating from three
components or subsystems: Parent, Adult, and Child. These three subsystems consist
of a collection of characteristics and related feelings that are diagrammed and
described in Figure 6.

Judgmental; critical of self and others;
moralistic
Logical; nonemotional; rational;
objective
Spontaneous; fun-loving; curious,
creative, impulsive

Figure 6. The Three Subsystems o f the Management Transaction Audit.
Each person completing the instrument identifies the relative size o f his or her
Parent, Adult, and Child in each o f the categories specified. The resulting profile
produces a plot of one’s disruptive-constructive tension index to show the degree to
which a crossed transaction is likely to occur in dealing with others because of one’s
innate feelings.
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The Desert Survival Situation and the Subarctic Survival Situation
Each o f these exercises explores the synergistic decision making capabilities
of a group. The skills involved are illustrated in the algorithm presented in Figure 7.
The participants are given basic information about the reasons for a perilous
situation in which they find themselves. In order to survive a plane crash, they must
make decisions about the relative value of certain items they have been able to
salvage. There are 15 items available in each situation. In the desert survival situation,
they are such things as a cosmetic mirror, one top coat per survivor, and one quart o f
water per survivor. In the subarctic survival situation they are such things as 13
wooden matches, a hand ax, and a 20' x 20' piece o f heavy duty canvas. A synergistic
decision making process then begins, using the elements in the algorithm. Each
participant first reasons and rank orders the 15 items according to personal
preferences. Then teams are formed and the team talks through and rank orders the
items again, as a group. The team may or may not have better judgment than any
individual in it. Is group decision making better than individual decision making? The
process tests the answer to that question by examining the kinds of transactions that
take place within the group.
The several hundred Agency personnel who had completed these diagnostic
instruments produced composite scores that reveal a great deal about the
organizational culture of the Agency. On the FIRO-B, the Agency looks like the
matrix in Table 3.
The organization is normative in expressed inclusion, expressed affection, and
wanted affection. The 5 in wanted affection is reassuring because it demonstrates
emotional stability. Whatever traumas the Agency periodically endures, it comes
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down on its feet. It is emotionally mature. The organization departs from the norm in
expressed control, indicating it likes to tell people what to do. It also departs in
wanted inclusion, indicating a strong preference for privacy, and in wanted control,
indicating a strong sense o f independence.
Table 3
Composite of FIRO-B for the Public Agency
I

C

A

E

5

7

5

W

1

2

5

Such a pronounced need for privacy identifies a workforce that has to exert
so much energy in meeting everyday professional requirements that it must take
advantage of every opportunity for privacy in order to regroup and recharge its
batteries to meet tomorrow’s responsibilities. Such a characteristic o f organizational
culture also identifies scientifically and/or technically trained personnel who are more
comfortable working alone than in groups, and who tend naturally to be introspective
and reflective. These same people typically are also independent to the point of being
unmanageable unless a cooptation process takes place. They do not automatically
obey anyone, and they will filter instructions through their own sense o f what is
appropriate. They will often do what they are told but in their own way. This
pronouncedpredisposition on the part ofAgency managers a t all levels creates an
equally pronounced need fo r mature leadership in the executive offices o f the
Agency. The high 7 on expressed control is yet another indication o f the willfulness
and self-directedness on the part of the average Agency manager.
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The composite picture of the Managerial Grid (Figure 8) shows the following
distribution in percentages across the four quadrants of the grid, along with the size
o f the centered 5/5 contingency management style.
9/9

1/9

10%

10%
5/5
40%

30%

10%
9/1

Figure 8. Composite of Managerial Grid for the Public Agency.
The Agency is disproportionately high in the incidence o f 5/S and 1/1
managers. The language the designers of the grid use to describe these respective
styles is that the 5/5 manager “understands the need to push for production but tries
to yield enough to maintain some kind of balance” (Chandler, 1992, p. 12) between
the contrary forces o f people and work. “He or she recognizes the incompatibility of
people and production, but, as a realist, is aware o f the need for both by the
organization” (Chandler, 1992, p. 12). The 1/1 manager behaves in a fashion that
“seeks neither to attain any real production nor to establish sound relationships. The
major goal is to stay out of trouble by avoiding risk and to meet only minimum
requirements for both production and relationships” (Chandler, 1992, p. 12).
It is obvious that a major flaw exists in an organizational culture that allows
such a high percentage o f l/l managers to be promoted. The reason is not hard to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77
find. Because one is a good forester or biologist or geologist does not necessarily
mean that one would also be a good manager o f foresters or biologists or geologists.
The very qualities that make one a good scientist, for example, might militate against
one being a good manager of accountability mechanisms, personal relationships, and
budgets. Yet one must become some sort of manager to advance organizationally in
the Agency beyond a certain point.
The dominant Agency type in the Johari Window exercise is the Unknown, or
Type A in the Johari classification system.
The Type A personality is described as follows:
This interpersonal style reflects minimal use o f both the Exposure and
Feedback processes and amounts to an impersonal approach to interpersonal
relationships. The Unknown is the largest region under this type and
unrealized potential and untapped creativity are the dominant influences. Such
a style often indicates withdrawal and an aversion to risk-taking on the part o f
its user. Interpersonal anxiety and safety seeking are likely to be the prime
sources o f personal motivation.
People who use this style often appear rigid and aloof and may be found in
bureaucratic organizations where it is possible, and perhaps profitable, to
avoid personal involvement. Other people are likely to react to persons using
this style with more than average hostility. They will tend to interpret the lack
of exposure and feedback solicitation in terms of their own needs and how
this style fails to fulfill those needs. (Chandler, 1992, pp. 13—14)
The correlations between and among the several diagnostics, and the bases
for the statements about the organizational culture of the Agency, begin to be seen
when this third instrument is introduced. Those who are private and independent on
the FIRO-B, for example, would also make minimal use of both the Exposure and
Feedback processes on the Johari Window. Those who withdraw and have an
aversion to risk-taking on the Johari Window would also find their natural home as
5/5 and l/l managers on the Managerial Grid. Those who are high on expressed
control on the FIRO-B would also appear rigid and aloof, and engender more than
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average hostility, on the Johari Window. The correlations are striking in their
consistency, especially when the fourth diagnostic is added, as follows.
In the Management Transaction Audit the Agency is characterized by
dominant Parent and Child subsystems (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. Composite of Management Transaction Audit for the Public Agency.
Both the Parent and Child contaminate the Adult, although the Parent
contaminates it more. The Adult subsystem is severely handicapped, and, as a result,
it is not able easily to express its feelings, attitudes, and opinions. It has trouble
verbalizing. In such cases the Parent-oriented person who enters into transactions
with others will come across as inflexible, prejudiced, unreasonable, and controlling
on the one hand, and, when the Child enters into the transaction from the other end
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o f the emotional spectrum, hypersensitive as well. Because the Adult subsystem is so
limited by the size o f the Parent subsystem, the manager does not have the capacity
for updating information easily or objectively, and thus gives the impression o f being
stubborn and persistent. From the Child subsystem comes the tendency for such a
manager to see the world as his or her playground, or, in the world of the Agency, as
the place where the manager invests his or her ideals and idealism. This is the world
o f true believers.
In terms o f its disruptive-constructive tension index, the Agency
organizational culture plots like this in the Transaction Audit (see Figure 10):
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Figure 10. Disruptive-Constructive Tension Index for the Public Agency.
The average Agency manager has between a 50% and 60% chance o f a
constructive communication, and only an 8% to 15% chance o f a disruptive
communication, depending on the category of transaction, i.e., subordinate,
colleague, or superior. The chances o f constructive communication are highest
between colleagues (50%) and lowest between a manager and his or her supervisor
(35%). These data display a fairly high degree of tension at work in the Agency.
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Both the Desert Survival Situation and the Subarctic Survival Situation show
high synergistic decision making capabilities among managers in the Agency as well
as individual reasoning capacities well above the national average. In the Desert
Survival Situation the average individual score o f 4,116 national participants was
63.2. In the Agency it was 53.1 (the lower the score the better the performance). The
average national team score was 39.7.
In the Subarctic Survival Situation the average individual score of 1,228
national participants was 47.3. In the Agency it was 43.0. The average national team
score was 29.8. The average Agency team score was 21.6.
These scores clearly indicate the superior ability o f Agency managers to
employ linear logic as individuals, and the ability to use interpersonal communication
skills in problem solving when given the opportunity. The second major
organizational defect which presents itself at this point is the Balkanization of the
Agency into highly decentralized and independent task centers which militate against
synergistic decision making. The formation o f functional cross-divisional task groups
would begin to utilize the Agency’s demonstrated capacity to problem solve in small
groups. Such small group tasking should begin in the executive staff itself, with
periodic meetings designed to confront specific problems (Chandler, 1992).
The summary phrases used below to describe the organizational culture o f the
Agency have been inductively, not deductively, arrived at. They come not from
general perceptions about what the Agency should be in terms o f general principles,
but from data gleaned from within the Agency about what it actually is. The
conclusions are drawn from the most sacrosanct recesses o f the mind and spirit, from
the personal psychologies, o f the people who do the agency’s work. The summary
phrases are self-explanatory. The Agency is characterized by an organizational
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culture which is: (a) professionally competent, (b) technically expert,
(c) geographically dispersed, (d) legally powerful, (e) politically controversial,
(f) historically resilient, (g) organizationally unmanageable, (h) personally
independent, (i) emotionally private, and (j) morally correct.
The foundational strength of the Agency is its human resources. The men and
women who work there are not perfect, but their expertise and their commitment to
professional excellence ranks them among the top five such public agencies in the
nation. The fact that they have not been afraid to look deeply into their own personal
and organizational selves to provide the evidence for this discussion shows the
greatest strength of all.
Points (f) and (g) above deserve a concluding comment. The Agency is
historically resilient because it has survived a remarkable series o f internal
reorganizations and external political wars over its soul. It keeps absorbing its critics
and coming back to fight another day. It is organizationally unmanageable because it
is really several agenices operating under one umbrella. Some o f these agencieswithin-the-agency are actually empires with their own clients and constituencies, and
not infrequently they work at cross-purposes to one another. The Agency is so farflung geographically and so decentralized in its decision making authority that it
reminds one of an army post commander out west in 1836. He had to trust his own
judgment.
So how can the people within such an organization be managed? Dr.
Chandler says, “They can be guided, instructed, corrected, and evaluated, but they
can hardly be managed in the traditional sense o f that term, especially when they are
so independent anyway” (Chandler, 1992, p. 20).
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CHAPTER IV
INTERVIEWS WITH TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM
Overall Summary of Leadership Team Interview Responses
in Relation to Weick’s Sensemaking Model
Weick (199S) describes sensemaking as being composed o f two major
processes. These are belief-driven processes and action-driven processes. There are
at least two forms of belief-driven processes: argument and expectations. Argument
refers to reasoned discourse as well as the fact that any opinion is potentially
controversial and subject to at least two conflicting sides. Weick says that meetings
are the setting where most arguments occur. Expectations are more directive than are
arguments. They filter inputs, and their formation and activation are critical for
sensemaking.
There are at least two forms of action-driven processes: behavioral
commitment and manipulation. Commitment is focused on a single action, and
manipulation is focused on multiple simultaneous actions. Commitment is a state
where an individual is bound by his actions, and through the actions to beliefs that
support his involvement. Manipulation involves acting in ways that create an
environment that allows individuals to comprehend and manage.
Sensemaking can be modeled as shown in Figure 11. This model of
sensemaking will be used to compare and contrast where the three categories of
interviewees reside. Each interviewee was asked 29 questions. Each question was
developed to specifically address the four major components of the sensemaking
82
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Argument

Expectation

ACTION

Commitment

Manipulation

Figure 11. Model o f Sensemaking.
model: Argument, Expectation, Commitment, and Manipulation. The questions were
developed by applying Weick’s discussion o f those four components and relating
them to the proposed restructuring events in the Agency. Fourteen o f the questions
involved a ranking on a Likert scale o f 1-5, while the remainder were open-ended
questions.
The tables presented below show a summary o f results for the Agency
Director, the Assistant Directors, and the Office Chiefs. Where applicable, an average
score for the 1-5 scale is used. For all categories, there is a rating o f low (1 to 2.5),
medium (2.5 to 3.5), or high (3.5 to 5). The purpose o f these tables is to present a
summary of the answers that each o f the three groups (Agency Director, Assistant
Directors, and Office Chiefs) gave in relation to how they perceived those three
groups residing in the four components of sensemaking.
Table 4, representing the Agency Director’s responses, contains the Agency
Director’s self-rating in the Agency Director column, and the Agency Director’s
impressions of the Assistant Directors and the Office Chiefs in the second and third
columns, respectively. In Table 5, the Assistant Directors provide their self-rating in
the second column, and their impressions of the Agency Director and the Office
Chiefs in the first and third columns, respectively. In Table 6, the Office Chiefs
provide their self-rating in the third column, and their impressions o f the Agency
Director and the Assistant Directors in the first and second columns, respectively.
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Table 4
Sensemaking Grid Summarizing the Agency Director’s Interview Responses
Agency Director

Assistant Directors

Office Chiefs

Argument

High

5

Low

2

Medium

3

Expectation

High

5

Medium

3

High

4

Commitment

High

5

High

4

Medium

3

Manipulation

Medium

Medium

Medium

Table 5
Sensemaking Grid Summarizing the Assistant Directors’ Interview Responses
Agency Director

Assistant Directors

Office Chiefs

Argument

Low

1/71

Low

2.28

Low

2.5

Expectation

High

4.14

High

4

High

3.57

Commitment

High

4.7

Low

1.86

Low

2.5

Manipulation

Low

Low

Low

Table 6
Sensemaking Grid Summarizing the Office Chiefs’ Interview Responses
Agency Director

Assistant Directors

Office Chiefs

Argument

Low

1.65

Low

1.6

Low

1.82

Expectation

Low

2.17

Low

2.13

Low

2.46

Commitment

High

4.35

Low

1.75

Low

2.25

Manipulation

Low

Low

Low
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The examination o f the tables highlights where there was convergence or
divergence between the three tables in each of the columns, as well as between the
corresponding rows in each o f the three tables. As an example, in the first column of
Table 4, the Agency Director rated himself high (S) in terms o f Argument, but the
Assistant Directors and the Office Chiefs rated him low in the Tables 5 and 6 (1.71
and 1.65, respectively). At the same time, moving across the first row of Table 4, the
Agency Director perceived the Assistant Directors as low in terms of Argument (as
did the Assistant Directors and Office Chiefs).
The following Overall Summaries for each of the four components in the
sensemaking model provide the reader with the critical results of the interviews.
Details of the results by question are presented after the summaries.
Overall Summary for Argument
1. The Agency Director felt he made a persuasive argument for the
restructuring proposal. However, a tremendous dichotomy existed between his views
and those of the Assistant Directors and the Office Chiefs. The latter two groups felt
that the arguments made by the Agency Director were not persuasive, or they did not
understand the rationale.
2. The support of the Assistant Directors and the Office Chiefs for the
restructuring proposal was viewed as consistently low by those groups as well as the
Agency Director.
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Overall Summary for Commitment
The Agency Director was consistently viewed as strongly committed to the
restructuring. The impact of his commitment on the organization was rated high, and
negative, by the Assistant Directors and the Office Chiefs.
The Assistant Directors were viewed by themselves and the Office Chiefs as
not being committed to the restructuring plan, and rated the impact on the
organization as highly negative. The Agency Director rated the Assistant Directors’
impact as more neutral.
The Office Chiefs were viewed almost uniformly as having medium to low
commitment to the restructuring plan, with their impact on the organization being
highly negative.
Overall Summary for Expectations
The Agency Director and Assistant Directors rated high in terms of their
expectations that the Agency Director would restructure the Agency. However, the
Office Chiefs differed significantly in their expectations. A majority of the Office
Chiefs did not expect any restructuring to take place.
The Office Chiefs also expected that the Assistant Directors would do little
regarding restructuring, and that they as Office Chiefs would do little regarding
restructuring. The expectations of the Agency Director and the Assistant Directors
regarding the Office Chiefs were higher.
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Overall Summary for Manipulation
The Agency Director was making some attempts at creating a supportive
environment for the restructuring plan. However, the Assistant Directors and Office
Chiefs were doing little to create a conducive environment. There was not a lot o f
effort by any o f the parties in this area. The Agency Director’s efforts seemed largely
directed at the external environment. The Office Chiefs’ efforts were centered on
mitigating the impacts to their staff once implementation became necessary.
Summary o f Interview Questions and Responses
Argument: Questions 1-6
Question # /; In your opinion, how persuasive an argument was made fo r the
restructuring o f the Department by the Director?
A distinct difference exists between the perceptions o f the Agency Director
compared to those of the Assistant Directors and Office Chiefs. The Agency Director
rated himself at a 5 on the 5-point scale in terms o f the persuasiveness of his
argument for restructuring the Agency, meaning that he felt his argument was very
persuasive. He stated that he was persuasive with the Governor, the Commission, and
the Legislature. The Agency Director felt that the Assistant Directors went along
with the restructuring but were dragging their heels, and that the Office Chiefs
followed the lead of their respective Assistant Director as to their level of support.
The Assistant Directors rated the Agency Director’s persuasiveness very low,
giving scores o f 1 and 2 on the 5-point scale. Their combined average score was
1.71. An exception to this was one Assistant Director who thought that upper
management was strongly persuaded (a score o f 5) by the Agency Director’s
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arguments, but that the Agency Director was not persuasive (a score o f 2) with the
rest o f the Agency, which he said was evidence of a “disconnect” between the top
management level and the rest o f the Agency. Another Assistant Director was
“totally opposed” to the Agency Director’s proposal, and said that the Field structure
was being singled out when there needed to be streamlining within the offices in the
central office. One Assistant Director said it was difficult to determine why the
Agency Director wanted to eliminate the Regions, and speculated that it might be for
personal reasons. Another said that the “Director wanted to please people” and that
the Agency Director felt that the Governor or the Commission wanted him to make
some changes. However, this same Assistant Director said that the Agency Director
“never got his own ownership o f it.” One Assistant Director said that the Agency
Director developed his plan in a “vacuum” and then attempted to implement it. And
finally, another Assistant Director said “I don’t recall hearing a lot o f rationale. I just
recall hearing that this is what was going to be done.”
The Office Chiefs had an average of 1.66, almost identical to the Assistant
Directors. Their comments had several common themes, including (a) a suspicion of
the Agency Director and his motives; (b) a belief that the Agency Director was
engaging in retribution toward certain employees; (c) a belief that the Agency
Director had a lack o f knowledge about the program areas of the Agency; and (d) a
belief that there was a lack of involvement, participation, and, therefore, ownership
by the Office Chiefs in the restructuring efforts.
The Office Chiefs did not feel that they were communicated with, and
strongly felt that there was not a group or team effort in determining the direction of
the restructuring proposal. Some felt that the Agency Director intentionally did not
communicate the real reason for the restructuring. Some felt that the Agency
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Director was trying to force compliance because he was the Agency Director, but
that he lacked the personal credibility to persuade staff to follow him. In addition to
feeling that the arguments for restructuring were not communicated well, many felt
that the issue that needed to be addressed was not structural in nature.
Question #2: From your perspective, what were the two mam components o f
the restructuring?
The Agency Director, the Assistant Directors, and the Office Chiefs
responded similarly to this question. The Agency Director identified balancing the
budget, and eliminating the Regional Supervisor layer of management as the two
main components. Almost all of the other respondents identified eliminating a layer o f
management, or flattening the organization, as one of the main components. A
majority identified balancing the budget as the other component. Other items
mentioned were streamlining decision making, endorsing total quality management,
consolidation of offices, and reducing the number of Districts. One Office Chief said
a major component was for the Agency Director to gain a higher status with the
Governor’s Office.
Essentially, there was unanimous agreement among the respondents.
Question #5: What do you think was behind the movement to restructure the
Department?
The Agency Director said that the restructuring took place because the
Governor was downsizing government and cutting the budget.
All o f the Assistant Directors mentioned pressure to cut the budget and
eliminate layers of management or flatten the organization as reasons for the
restructuring. So there was a great degree o f agreement on these points. However,
five o f the seven Assistant Directors interviewed also said that within this context the
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Agency Director was acting out o f vindictiveness, with ulterior motives, and for
personal reasons when he singled out the Regional Supervisors layer o f management
for elimination.
The Office Chiefs’ responses were similar to the Assistant Directors’
responses, and fell into three major categories. One was that the Governor’s Office
was looking for the Agency to reduce employees and eliminate layers of
management. A second was that budget constraints and downsizing were forcing the
Agency to look at changes. And the third was that the Agency Director wanted to get
rid of the Regional structure due to his personal feelings for individuals at that level in
the organization.
In summary, there was a great degree of similarity between the three groups
as to the reasons behind the restructuring. There was also a very strong feeling or
belief on the part of many respondents that the Agency Director was also acting out
of vindictiveness and for personal reasons by deciding that the Regional Supervisors
should be eliminated. The perceived lack of input by the Assistant Directors and the
Office Chiefs into the decision to eliminate the Regional Supervisors lent further
credence to this observation.
Question #4: In your opinion, did you think that restructuring the
Department in this way was a good idea?
The Agency Director rated this a 4 out of 5. He felt that the Agency had too
many managers at too high of a level within the Agency.
The Assistant Directors had an average of 3.43 out of 5, relatively close to
the Agency Director’s rating. However, the responses ranged from a 1 to a S. Three
of the Assistant Directors felt that the idea of restructuring and reducing mid-level
management was a good one, and strongly supported the proposal at the S level. One

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91
Assistant Director strongly felt that the Agency Director was simply being vindictive
against the Field structure, and rated the idea at a 1 level. The remaining three
Assistant Directors indicated that they did not feel there was a good explanation of
the proposal, did not understand the reasons behind it, and felt that there was poor
communication and little or no attempt to get buy-in from staff. They rated the
proposal at 2 and 3 on the scale.
The Office Chiefs rated much lower than the Agency Director or the Assistant
Directors, with an average o f 2.25 out o f 5. Many made a distinction between the
concept that restructuring should take place, as opposed to the specific restructuring
proposal put forth by the Agency Director. Their comments included having
suspicions regarding the Agency Director’s motives since he appeared to be targeting
individuals for personal reasons, feeling that there was no opportunity or attempt to
gain staff support, not understanding the rationale for the proposed changes, and the
fact that elements of the proposal kept changing over time. One Office Chief stated,
“The process was workable but fatal.” Another said, “Anybody can make changes.
The trick is to make changes that improve things rather than make them worse.”
Overall, there was confusion and a feeling o f alienation from the decision
making process for the restructuring proposal.
This question points out a deep division between the Agency Director, the
Assistant Directors, and the Office Chiefs. There was a significant difference of
opinion within the Assistant Directors regarding the proposal, ranging from strong
support to strong disagreement. There was an even more significant level of
disagreement among the Office Chiefs, who felt further alienated from the process
and given little or no opportunity to provide input into decisions significantly
affecting them and their staff.
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Question #5: How much supportfor restructuring camefrom the Deputy
Directors?
In general, there is a fair amount o f agreement by the Agency Director,
Assistant Directors, and Office Chiefs that there was not much support from the
Assistant Directors for the restructuring proposal. The Agency Director rated their
support a 2 out o f 5, indicating that the Assistant Directors in the central office may
have understood the proposal better than the Regional Assistant Directors, but that
did not mean that they supported the proposal.
The Assistant Directors rated themselves at a combined average o f 2.28 out
of 5. They felt that there was one, maybe two Assistant Directors who supported the
proposal. They were unanimous in that they didn’t feel there was support from the
Regional Assistant Directors. It was indicated that some Assistant Directors actively
opposed the proposal. Another made the distinction that the Assistant Directors were
willing to support the objectives of the restructuring, but not the specific
restructuring proposal put forth by the Agency Director.
The Office Chiefs rated the Assistant Directors’ support at a combined
average of 1.6 out of 5. Many indicated that behind the scenes, several of the
Assistant Directors resisted the proposal openly and vigorously. It was clear to the
Office Chiefs that there was not uniform support among the Assistant Directors and
that many were simply giving lip service support for the proposal. The perception
was that the Assistant Directors did not work well together, and that there was no
cohesion among the Agency Director’s leadership team.
Question #6 How much supportfo r restructuring cane from the
Division/Office Chiefs?
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The Agency Director rated the Office Chiefs at a 3 out o f 5, feeling that they
were a little more supportive than the Assistant Directors because they could see that
some o f the people above them were being reduced through the restructuring
proposal, namely a Regional Assistant Director. Also, he felt that elimination o f the
Regional Supervisors would be viewed by the Office Chiefs as giving them more
authority for decisions in the field, and therefore they were more supportive o f the
restructuring proposal.
The Assistant Directors rated the Office Chiefs’ support at an average o f 2.5
out of 5, slightly below the Agency Director’s ranking. However, in their view the
Office Chiefs were not involved, consulted, or made part o f the development o f the
restructuring proposal. They felt that the Office Chiefs were operating fairly
independent o f the Agency Director and Assistant Directors, and certainly did not
like the idea o f being told how to restructure.
The Office Chiefs rated themselves at an average o f 1.82 out o f 5 in terms of
support. They viewed themselves as left out of the process, and for the most part
were not supportive of the plan. They felt that the Agency Director did not fully
understand their programs and how they functioned, and that the Regional Assistant
Directors certainly did not understand the environmental programs administered by
the Agency. The exception seemed to be the Administrative side o f the Agency,
which was somewhat supportive o f the restructuring proposal while acknowledging
that it had little impact on their operations.
Overall Summary for Argument
1.

The Agency Director felt he made a persuasive argument for the

restructuring proposal. However, a tremendous dichotomy existed between his views
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and those o f the Assistant Directors and the Office Chiefs. The latter two groups felt
that the arguments made by the Agency Director were not persuasive, or they didn’t
understand the rationale.
2.

The support o f the Assistant Directors and the Office Chiefs for the

restructuring proposal was viewed as consistently low by those groups as well as the
Agency Director.
Commitment: Questions 7-17
Question 7: In your opinion, how committed was the Director toward
restructuring the Department?
The Agency Director indicated that he was committed at the 5 level. He said
that he put his career, integrity and reputation on the line in attempting the
restructuring.
The Assistant Directors averaged a 4.7 out of 5 in terms of how they viewed
the Agency Director’s commitment. One Assistant Director said, “He was hell-bent
on election to reorganize.” Another indicated, “I don’t know why he was doing it
specifically, but he was 100% in favor. I never could figure out, was it span of
control, was it saving money? I just don’t know what it was. I really don’t.” Another
Assistant Director said that the Agency Director miscalculated the power and
political acumen o f the staff, while another indicated that the Agency Director had
good instincts, but didn’t seem to have the strength to carry it off.
The Office Chiefs averaged 4.3 5 out o f 5 on the scale, and viewed the Agency
Director as very committed to seeing the restructuring implemented.
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So on this question, there is a near-uniform view by the Agency Director,
Assistant Directors and Office Chiefs that the Agency Director was very committed
to restructuring the Agency.
Question #8: How did he show this commitment?
The Agency Director said that he talked to the media, Legislature, and that he
explained the plan and stood behind it.
The Assistant Directors pointed out that he issued direct orders, kept
restructuring maps visible in his office, brought in speakers from the Governor’s
Office and the Management and Budget Office, and continued to press the issue
forward with the Commission. One o f the Assistant Directors also pointed out that
the Agency Director’s explanations left room for misinterpretation as to what he was
trying to achieve, and another said that the Agency Director did not show resolve
“when it came down to crunch time.” This was described as intellectual ascension to
restructuring but lack o f managerial follow-through and commitment.
The Office Chiefs described the Agency Director as persistent and tenacious,
strongly committed to making a change, and not willing to entertain any alternatives
to the plan. They thought he showed commitment by talking about the plan, although
several indicated that the Agency Director talked about commitment, but didn’t
demonstrate it through his actions.
In summary, there was a fairly uniform perspective as to how the Agency
Director showed his commitment, but an underlying doubt about the wisdom of his
commitment to a plan that had little overall support.
Question #9; What impact do you think the D irector’s commitment had on
the organization?
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The Agency Director felt that he had a great impact, whether it was good,
bad, or otherwise. He rated his commitment at a 5.
The Assistant Directors averaged 4.43 out o f S on the scale. To a person,
they felt that the impact of the Agency Director’s commitment was negative. Two of
the Assistant Directors used the term “devastating” to describe the impact. One said
the Agency Director’s commitment resulted in “total disarray” in the Agency for 6
months, and described the restructuring process as an “unanticipated, improperly
managed impact.” Another indicated that since the Agency Director was the most
committed and there was only moderate support from those around him, that he
needed to move fast in implementing his decision but he didn’t.
The Office Chiefs averaged 3.94 out of 5 in terms of the impact of the
Agency Director’s commitment, and they felt that the impact was negative. Again,
several of them used the term “devastating” to describe the impact. Several described
this as a negative, divisive, and unproductive period. They felt it was made clear to
them that the Agency Director did not value their input, and this resulted in a
widening gulf between the Agency Director’s Office and the Office Chiefs. It also
further verified the views of some that the Agency Director was not an effective
manager, and that there was not a good rationale being put forth for restructuring.
Distrust of the Agency Director increased.
In summary, there was general agreement that the Agency Director’s
commitment to the restructuring had a great impact on the organization. It is also
clear that the Assistant Directors and Office Chiefs viewed that impact as negative.
Question 10: In your opinion, how committed were the Deputy Directors to
achieving the proposed restructuring goal?
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The Agency Director felt that they were initially against it, but that when the
budget cuts became necessary that they knew something had to be done. He felt that
the commitment was mixed, but that support was as high as a five on the items where
there was agreement.
The Assistant Directors averaged a 1.86 out o f 5 in terms of their view of
their own commitment. There was general agreement that the Regional Assistant
Directors and at least one of the central office Assistant Directors did not support the
restructuring, and at best there were two Assistant Directors in support. The
Assistant Directors viewed their commitment as a whole as limited, and neutral. One
Assistant Director described their support as “going through the motions.”
The Office Chiefs averaged 1.75 out o f 5 on the scale in terms of the
Assistant Directors’ commitment to the restructuring. They felt that the Assistant
Directors were not committed to the plan, with possibly one or two exceptions.
Many Office Chiefs felt that some o f the Assistant Directors actively opposed the
plan and took actions to overtly undermine the proposal. The Office Chiefs felt that
the Assitant Directors did not sell the proposal because they didn’t have a good
understanding o f it, that leadership was not being exercised appropriately, and that
the proposal kept changing over time for reasons that were not understood.
In summary, there was a significant difference between the Agency Director
compared to the Assistant Directors and Office Chiefs in terms o f their perceptions of
the commitment of the Assistant Directors and Office Chiefs. Both the Assistant
Directors and the Office Chiefs rated the level of commitment very low, while the
Agency Director viewed it as a mixed bag, but in a more positive light.
Question #11: Haw did they show this commitment?
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The Agency Director felt that the Assistant Directors showed their
commitment by their attendance at the many meetings that were held, and by his
perception that they were professional. He indicated that “you had to keep
hammering them until you finally got them to agree to what it is you were trying to
do.”
The Assistant Directors felt that they had a very limited commitment to the
restructuring proposal, and that they showed this by their neutrality, by going through
the motions of commitment, and by their silence. Many did not actively work for the
change because they didn’t see where it would result in organizational improvements.
Some mentioned that there seemed to be a never-ending decision loop, where
decisions would constantly be revisited. Part of the lack of commitment on the
Regional Assitant Directors’ part was the fact that they had close ties and in many
cases socialized with the people whose jobs would be adversely impacted by the
restructuring proposal.
The Office Chiefs felt that the Assistant Directors showed their lack of
commitment through their body language, by giving lip service to the proposal but
making negative comments in confidence, and by their silence. They were viewed as
not actively supporting the proposal, and in many cases were viewed as undercutting
the proposal by the conversations they had with both internal and external groups. It
was also stated that some of the Assistant Directors did end runs and talked with
members of the Commission and the Legislature.
Question #12: What impact did their commitment have on the organization?
The Agency Director felt that the impact was a mixed bag, and rated it a 3
out o f 5 on the scale.
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The Assistant Directors rated their impact at 4.57 out o f 5 on the scale, and
the impact was negative in terms of commitment to the plan. They felt that they
substantially delayed the plan, and viewed their actions as attempting to keep the
Agency stabilized and under control. They were trying to justify the Agency
Director’s commitment, but felt that their own credibility was on the line. This lack o f
commitment on the part o f the Assistant Directors also encouraged Office Chiefs
who were not supportive. As one Assistant Director said, “The leaders had a cold,
the organization had the flu.”
The Office Chiefs rated the impact of the Assistant Directors’ commitment at
an average of 4.37 out o f 5 on the scale, and again viewed it as a negative impact.
They felt that this lack o f commitment set in motion the eventual resignation o f the
Agency Director, and that the employees of the Agency mirrored the lack of
commitment that the Assistant Directors displayed. The Assistant Directors left the
impression that the decision was the Agency Director’s, not theirs, and they felt that
this lack of commitment resulted in instability and turmoil.
In summary, there was a significant negative impact perceived by both the
Assistant Directors and the Office Chiefs in terms of the lack o f commitment o f the
Assistant Directors to the proposed restructuring proposal.
Question 13: In your opinion, how committed were the Division/Office
Chiefs toward achieving the proposed restructuring?
There was general agreement between the Agency Director, Assistant
Directors and Office Chiefs, with ratings of 3,2.6, and 2.25, respectively, on the 5point scale.
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The Agency Director rated the commitment at a 3 because he felt that the
Office Chiefs had been through many budget cuts over the years and that they
thought that this plan may or may not be implemented.
The Assistant Directors ranked the Office Chiefs at a 2.6 because they felt
that there was not agreement with the plan, that the Office Chiefs were not involved
or co-opted, and that there was no clear articulation of what would replace the
Regional Supervisors in the Field. One Assistant Director thought the Office Chiefs
were more committed than the Agency Director or the Assistant Directors even
though they didn’t necessarily agree with the plan.
The Office Chiefs rated themselves at a 2.25 out o f 5. They felt that they were
skeptical, were not free to express dissenting opinions, and were not involved in the
development of the plan. A majority were opposed, but many indicated that once the
decision was final there was a strong commitment to implement the plan in the best
manner possible.
Question 14: How did they show this commitment?
The Agency Director thought the Office Chiefs showed their commitment by
coming to the meetings with organization charts and budget and employee numbers,
and by attempting to justify how they would function without the Regional
Supervisor layer of management.
The Assistant Directors thought the Office Chiefs weren’t committed for a
variety of reasons, a major one being that they were not involved in the decision
making process. Other reasons included an unwillingness to give up power, control
and discretion in the Field, and delays in getting requested information.
The Office Chiefs felt they showed their lack of commitment throughout the
process by speaking up and expressing concerns at leadership meetings, by letting
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their staff know that they weren’t committed, by being reluctant to change. However,
some pointed out that this reluctance was due to the fact that they didn’t understand
the specific plan and its rationale. One individual said, “I am not sure that they were
really given a chance to commit to it and show their commitment because they really
weren’t involved in the development o f it.”
Question 15: What impact did their commitment have on the organization?
The Agency Director rated the Office Chiefs at a 3 out o f 5. He indicated that
some were supportive, and some were not.
The Assistant Directors felt that the Office Chiefs had a more negative impact
on the organization than the Agency Director thought, rating the impact at 3.7 out o f
5. One of the reasons for this was that the Office Chiefs were not involved, never
bought in to the restructuring plan, and therefore their support was minimal. Several
of the Assistant Directors felt that this resulted in staff becoming unfocused due to
their confusion, an impact which they feel was long-lasting.
The Office Chiefs, similar to the Assistant Directors, believed that their
commitment, or lack thereof had a more negative effect than was perceived by the
Agency Director. They rated themselves at an average o f 4 out of 5 on the scale, with
the impact being negative. They felt that their lack of commitment lead to a lack of
commitment by the staff in the Agency, thereby undermining the proposal. So most
of the support for the proposal appeared to them to be coming from the Agency
Director and the Assistant Directors, with that support decreasing significantly as one
moved downward into the Agency.
Question 16: How committed were you to the proposed restructuring?
Question 17: Why?
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The Agency Director had indicated that he was completely committed to the
restructuring, at a level o f five on the scale.
The Assistant Directors, in their responses, revealed a significant split
amongst themselves and with the Agency Director, in terms of their commitment.
Several also pointed out the difference between their personal and professional
commitment. Three o f the Assistant Directors rated themselves at a 2 or lower out of
5 on the scale. One o f them said, “I was always a good soldier and supported the
boss, but I reluctantly supported any restructuring.” This individual felt that the
restructuring proposal did not help to serve the public better or to manage the
resources better. The second Assistant Director said that he was personally against
the restructuring, but that he reluctantly supported the plan because of his location in
the structure of the organization. The third Assistant Director in this category didn’t
like the plan and was not convinced whether it was right or wrong. This person said,
“And I truly never felt I knew the real reason for restructuring. And so I never had
personal commitment for the restructuring.” This individual also indicated that the
plan was not flattening the agency but simply changing the field structure, and that
the MRC report was being used as a reason to restructure. Another Assistant
Director rated at a 3 out of 5 for personal commitment, pointing out that
restructuring was not supportive o f the MRC report, and that the commitment was
not there because an “honest approach” as to why we were restructuring was not
being used.
At the other end of the spectrum, there were three Assistant Directors who
felt that they were committed at a 5-level. One of them said, “I think it was the right
thing to do for the agency. Now having said that, I think we went about it in entirely
the wrong way.” This person felt that there would have been a major difference if

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

103
time had been spent involving the Office Chiefs. Another o f these Assistant Directors
felt that changes in the Agency were necessary, that the talents of staff were not
being fully utilized, and that there were too many people in the Agency who felt that
they were the Agency Director.
In summary, the Assistant Directors were very split in terms of their
commitment to the restructuring, with a clear distinction being made for support for
the principles of restructuring, as opposed to less support for the specific
restructuring plan being forwarded. Another major dichotomy was the distinction that
several made between their personal feelings o f nonsupport versus their duty as a
member of the Leadership Team to support the Agency Director.
The Office Chiefs were similar to the Assistant Directors in terms of varying
levels of their commitment. Again the distinction was made between the merits and
principles of restructuring, to which many voiced their support, as opposed to the
specific proposed restructuring plan, which many opposed or did not support. A
fairly common response from the Office Chiefs was that they became very committed
to making the restructuring plan work once it was clear that the decision was final to
proceed. This manifested itself in a determination to make the best of the situation.
One Office Chief pointed out that they did not know or did not understand the
reasoning behind the plan, and were never asked to support or help to sell the plan.
One individual stated that he viewed his assignment as helping the Agency Director,
but that “there weren’t very good reasons behind it.” Another said that an inability to
accept flexibility was a major problem. Several Office Chiefs felt that the Agency
Director did not have a good understanding o f the Field and how it functioned, and
therefore that the plan was flawed.
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Overall Summary for Commitment
The Agency Director was consistently viewed as strongly committed to the
restructuring. The impact o f his commitment on the organization was rated high, and
negative, by the Assistant Directors and the Office Chiefs.
The Assistant Directors were viewed by themselves and the Office Chiefs as
not being committed to the restructuring plan, and rated the impact on the
organization as highly negative. The Agency Director rated the Assistant Directors1
impact as more neutral.
The Office Chiefs were viewed almost uniformly as having medium to low
commitment to the restructuring plan, with their impact on the organization being
highly negative.
Expectation: Questions 18-22
Question 18: In what direction did you hope the Director would take the
Department?
The Agency Director wanted more decision making on the front lines. He
wanted staff to be more accountable, and for the organization to be customeroriented and user-friendly.
The Assistant Directors mentioned a variety of issues. One o f them wanted
the “status quo.” Another was hoping the Agency Director could provide a greater
degree o f independence from the Governor’s Office, while still another wanted the
Agency Director to develop a better rapport with the Governor’s Office. One o f the
Assistant Directors was hoping the Agency Director would provide clear direction
and gain the political and popular commitment from interest groups to implement the
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restructuring. One Assistant Director wanted there to be more trust in the workforce,
more inclusiveness in decision making, and more public articulation of the Agency’s
needs.
Many of the Office Chiefs mentioned that they hoped the Agency Director
would concentrate on the vision and mission o f the Agency to improve delivery of
services, and that he would involve employees in the decision making processes,
using teams where appropriate. Several thought that the best they could hope for was
that the Agency Director would maintain the status quo, and felt that the Agency
Director did not have the program experience to lead the Agency. Most felt that the
proposed restructuring did not address their concerns, nor did it address the real
issues facing the Agency. Several described it as not recognizing the varying needs of
the different Offices in the Agency, and trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.
Question 19: What new initiatives were you lookingfo r the Director to
pursue? D id any o f them occur? Why do you think they did? For those that did not
occur, why do you think they did not?
The Agency Director indicated that he wanted to pursue initiatives relating to
Customer Service, Total Quality Management, improving communications with the
public, and reducing permit backlogs.
The Assistant Directors identified initiatives such as Land Use Planning,
privatization of services, an Urban Initiative, and providing technical assistance to
landowners. While one o f the Assistant Directors acknowledged progress in the area
of total quality management, the others said that the initiatives they hoped to see did
not occur because the Agency Director became enmeshed in the restructuring o f the
Agency. Many felt that the Agency Director was too controlling, and did not show
leadership in these areas.
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A majority of the Office Chiefs had no expectations for the Agency Director
to pursue new initiatives. Those who did have expectations found that they were not
met. Areas that were identified included stabilization and growth in the budget,
strong support of environmental programs and enforcement, supporting the Great
Lakes Initiative, and fostering better working relationships between staff in the
central office versus staff in the field. One Office Chief said, “I never saw any real
initiative that I could identify.” Still another said, “I felt the Director had very little
influence on the major policy issues.”
In summary, the Office Chiefs had very little that they expected from the
Agency Director in terms o f new initiatives, and those who did found that there was
little demonstration of support for what they felt was important.
Question 20: What did you expect that the Director would do regarding
restructuring the Department?
The Agency Director rated himself at a 5 in terms of expecting to restructure
the Agency. He indicated that his thought was to try to re-energize people to do
better in the areas of the Agency where he felt things were not going well.
The Assistant Directors also expected that the Agency Director would
restructure, combining for an average o f 4.14 out of 5 on the scale. One of the
Assistant Directors pointed out that he didn’t feel the Agency Director had a clear
vision for how things would function after the Regional Supervisors were eliminated.
Another said that while he expected the Agency Director to restructure, the vision as
to why was never forthcoming. A third said that the restructuring was expected
because the Agency Director thought that was what the Governor, Commission, and
external interests wanted. Only one Assistant Director initially thought there would
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be no restructuring, and indicated, “I could never figure out why he was doing it. I
never thought it was going to get done.”
The Office Chiefs revealed a marked difference between the Agency Director
and the Assistant Directors in terms o f their expectations. They averaged a score o f
2.17 out of 5 on the scale, indicating that their expectations of the Agency Director
restructuring were much lower. A majority of the Office Chiefs expected the Agency
Director to do nothing regarding restructuring. O f those who did expect
restructuring, the reasons indicated varied from the view that he had made
commitments prior to becoming Agency Director, to expecting that any change
would be based on the MRC report and the data and recommendations it contained.
One individual stated, “I didn’t expect him to do a lot simply because it was obvious
that controversy bothered him.”
Question 21: What did you expect the Deputy Directors would do regarding
restructuring?
The Agency Director expected a S, but rated the Assistant Directors at a 3
out of 5 on the scale. He thought they would embrace the restructuring more than
they did. He felt that they needed to “step to the plate.” He stated that the Agency
was not going to stay the same, and that if it did not change the Governor,
Commission, or the Legislature would change it.
The Assistant Directors rated themselves slightly lower in terms of their
expectations as to what they would do regarding restructuring, averaging a 4 out o f 5
on the scale. However, they acknowledged that they would have expected to support
the Agency Director more than they did, that their job was to assist him, but that
some of the Assistant Directors were not engaged or were outright opposed to the
restructuring.
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The Office Chiefs expected that the Assistant Directors would do little
regarding restructuring, rating them at an average o f 2.13 out o f 5 on the scale. One
of the Office Chiefs said that a reason for this was that the Assistant Directors were
not a party to the development of the restructuring plan. Another said that the plan
was almost exclusively the Agency Director’s, and therefore the Assistant Directors
did not feel that they were a part of developing it. Some expected more support,
some expected the status quo, while others expected the Assistant Directors to fight
the restructuring every step o f the way.
Question 22: What did you expect the Division/Office Chiefs would do
regarding restructuring?
The Agency Director expected the Office Chiefs to be a 4 out of S on the
scale in terms of restructuring. He felt that communication with them could have
been better, and that he did not meet with them near enough.
The Assistant Directors, similar to the Agency Director, rated the Office
Chiefs at an average o f 3.57 out of 5 on the scale. Those who rated the Office Chiefs
higher on the scale said that their expectations were that there would be proper
guidance from the Assistant Directors, and that they would be brought into the
development of the restructuring plan, neither of which occurred in their opinion.
Others thought they would resist unless they were consulted and brought on board
with the plan.
The Office Chiefs rated themselves at an average o f 2.46 out of S on the
scale, lower than the Agency Director or the Assistant Directors. Their reasoning was
that the Office Chiefs wanted the status quo, were resistant to change, or weren’t
involved in developing the restructuring plan. Even those who rated their
expectations of the Office Chiefs high recognized that in reality there wasn’t a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

109
commitment. As one individual said, “I think only the Director had in mind what he
wanted to do, and he didn’t have a very definitive plan of what he wanted to do
except respond to what he perceived he was being told to do.”
Overall Summary for Expectations
The Agency Director and Assistant Directors rated high in terms o f their
expectations that the Agency Director would restructure the Agency. However, the
Office Chiefs differed significantly in their expectations. A majority of the Office
Chiefs did not expect any restructuring to take place.
The Office Chiefs also expected that the Assistant Directors would do little
regarding restructuring, and that they as Office Chiefs would do little regarding
restructuring. The expectations of the Agency Director and the Assistant Directors
regarding the Office Chiefs were higher.
Manipulation: Questions 23-28
Question 23: How did the Director try to create an environment conducive to
restructuring?
The Agency Director indicated that he tried to express what he thought the
Governor’s Office, the Legislature, and the Commission wanted for the Agency. He
said he tried to lay out the facts and the budget.
The Assistant Directors indicated that the Agency Director tried in several
ways to create a conducive environment, including having brainstorming sessions
with the Leadership Team, having strategic planning sessions, trying to communicate
the rationale for the restructuring, and eventually involving the Office Chiefs. Yet at
the same time the Assistant Directors said that the Agency Director did not
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communicate well, and that the message and rationale were not clear. They felt that a
better explanation of the restructuring would have created a better environment. They
felt that he brought the Office Chiefs into the process too late, which created the
sense that he really didn’t want their input. Some o f the Assistant Directors thought
the Agency Director feared the Office Chiefs. It was felt that he was trying to sell the
restructuring to the public before doing so internally within the Agency. One
Assistant Director said, “It was all very vague.”
A majority of the Office Chiefs felt that the Agency Director did not try to
create an atmosphere conducive to restructuring, or did very little. Many questioned
the Agency Director’s motives and were skeptical of him. They felt he had already
made up his mind, and that there was little or no room for negotiations as to what
would be done. Others said that he attempted to communicate via E-mail and at some
meetings, but that the communications were not well done. The general sense was
that the decisions were being dictated by the Agency Director, that the logic o f those
decisions was faulty, and that he was not managing and controlling the process.
Question # 24: How did the Deputy Directors try to create an environment
conducive to restructuring?
The Agency Director said that the Assistant Directors tried to create a
conducive environment by participating in the Leadership Team meetings, and also
went back and presented the information to their respective Offices. He said, “I think
they honestly tried to do th a t. . .”
A majority of the Assistant Directors felt that they did not create a conducive
environment, even those who were in favor o f the restructuring. One o f the Assistant
Directors felt that it was difficult to create a conducive environment, and felt that he
was walking a tightrope of trying to maintain his credibility with staff, and at the
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same time be supportive of the plan. He summed it up by saying, “It was pretty
touchy.” Another pointed out that the Assistant Directors argued with each other,
and conveyed those negative feelings when they discussed the restructuring with
staff. Still another Assistant Director indicated that there was a lot o f disharmony on
the Leadership Team, and that the Leadership Team was a “house divided.” And
finally, one Assistant Director said, “We weren’t given the chance to create the
environment.” He said that they were ordered to take actions but not talk to anyone
outside of the Leadership Team.
A majority o f the Office Chiefs felt that the Assistant Directors did nothing to
create a conducive environment because they were not supportive o f the plan.
Another Office Chief said that at best, the Assistant Directors did not oppose the plan
publicly, either externally or internally. A few more felt that the Assistant Directors
tried to make the best of the situation, and supported the Office Chiefs in looking at
alternatives to the restructuring plan and involving staff.
Question #25: Haw did that compare with the D irector’s actions?
The Agency Director stated, “I thought we were on the same page ”
However, he acknowledged that some of the Assistant Directors were not, due to
their body language, and what they did not say. He indicated that there were some
aspects of the plan that no one really wanted to do, but that had to be done due to
budget constraints, as well as the expectations and the goals that he had set as
Director of the Agency. Finally, the Agency Director stated that he trusted everyone,
but he felt that there was some undermining taking place.
The Assistant Directors felt that they played a much more active role than the
Agency Director did in terms o f involving staff in the process of implementing the
restructuring plan, and in looking at alternative ways o f achieving the goals of the
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plan. They felt that the Agency Director did not take many overt actions to create a
conducive environment. Several felt that they were not in synch with the Agency
Director, and at times worked “at counter-purposes.” One Assistant Director stated
that the Agency Director did not want to create a conducive environment because he
had his own agenda and was going to implement it.
The Office Chiefs, almost to a person, felt that the Assistant Directors did not
support the restructuring plan, and that the actions o f the Assistant Directors were
“diametrically opposed” to the Agency Director’s actions. They described their view
o f a very sharp contrast between the Agency Director and the Assistant Directors.
Some felt that the Assistant Directors were undercutting and subverting the Agency
Director. At the same time, they felt that the Assistant Directors did a better job than
the Agency Director o f obtaining their input and of being more open-minded and
asking questions of the Office Chiefs. In general, they felt that the Assistant Directors
were pulling in a different direction than was the Agency Director.
Question #26: How did the Division Chiefs try to create an environment
conducive to restructuring?
The Agency Director thought that the actions o f the Office Chiefs was a
“mixed bag.” He felt that some tried to create a conducive environment, some didn’t
say anything, and others worked against creating a conducive environment.
The Assistant Directors felt that the Office Chiefs either did nothing to create
a conducive environment, were not engaged in the discussions, or actively worked to
create a negative environment. One Assistant Director felt that you could not trust or
rely on them. Still another described their actions as “passive-aggressive.” Finally,
one Assistant Director said that the Office Chiefs had nothing to gain by creating a
conducive environment.
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The Office Chiefs described their efforts not in terms o f creating a conducive
atmosphere for implementation of the restructuring plan, but rather as trying to create
an environment where they could support their staff and mitigate the negative
impacts that the plan would have on their respective staff They felt they were trying
to make the best of a bad situation, and were engaged in creating alternative
strategies that would hopefully meet the Agency Director’s objectives and minimize
the impacts on employees. One Office Chief said that they were trying to create a
good rationale for the proposed changes, but they weren’t necessarily recommending
the same change that the Agency Director was advocating.
Question #27: How did that compare with the D irector’s and the Deputy
Directors ’ actions?
The Agency Director felt that the Leadership Team listened to the Office
Chiefs. He stated that the feedback from the Office Chiefs worked its way up to the
Leadership Team.
The Assistant Directors had differing opinions. Two of the Assistant
Directors described the Office Chiefs as cynical and not doing anything to create a
conducive environment. Two other Assistant Directors felt that the Office Chiefs
were working harder and doing more to make the restructuring work than were the
Assistant Directors. Two of the Assistant Directors felt that the Assistant Directors
were a problem, with one Assistant Director saying, “The [Assistant Directors], I
think, were the biggest problem to making it work.”
The majority o f the Office Chiefs felt that they were the most pro-active
group in terms of trying to make the restructuring work, and in terms o f being
concerned for the welfare o f the employees who would be affected by the
restructuring. Several viewed the Agency Director and the Assistant Directors as
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utilizing a top-down, more autocratic approach. One Office Chief described the
Agency Director’s attitude as “[Office] Chiefs be damned, we are moving ahead with
this anyway.” And several others viewed the Office Chiefs and the Assistant
Directors as being similar in that they were looking for ways to stop or alter the
restructuring plan, and therefore diametrically opposed to the Agency Director. One
Office Chief said, “I think we just thought we were right. We were never convinced
otherwise.”
Question #28: What actions did you pursue personalty to create an
environment conducive to the change?
The Agency Director previously had stated that he tried to express his
interpretation of what the Governor’s Office, the Legislature, and the Commission
wanted for the Agency.
None of the Assistant Directors said that they felt that the specific
restructuring plan was a good idea that they folly supported. At best, the majority
appeared to be neutral, and one Assistant Director admitted to being an opponent of
the plan and said, “I did not create a positive environment.” Another Assistant
Director said that he “was not enthusiastic” about the abolishment of the Regions.
Another said that he tried to get the Assistant Directors involved in helping the
Agency Director to find an alternative solution.
The Office Chiefs, like the Assistant Directors, did not voice support for the
restructuring plan. They described their actions as making the best of the orders that
they had been presented with, and attempting to mitigate what they saw as the
negative impacts that the restructuring plan entailed. They felt that they did their best
to work with staff, keep them informed, and try to put as positive a spin on events as
they could.
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Overall Summary for Manipulation
The Agency Director was making some attempts at creating a supportive
environment for the restructuring plan. However, the Assistant Directors and Office
Chiefs were doing little to create a conducive environment. There was not a lot of
effort by any o f the parties in this area. The Agency Director’s efforts seemed largely
directed at the external environment. The Office Chiefs’ efforts were centered on
mitigating the impacts to their staff once implementation became necessary.
Question #29: What do you fe e l could have or should have been done
differently? By whom?
The Agency Director said that he would have communicated more directly
with the Governor, as well as more often and directly with the Office Chiefs.
Four of the Assistant Directors said that there should have been no
restructuring and that the MRC report should have been followed in that regard. One
Assistant Director said that once the Agency Director decided to go against the MRC
report, that he was “doomed,” and that the Leadership Team shifted gears too many
times by making so many adjustments to the restructuring plan. Three o f the
Assistant Directors specifically mentioned that the process should have been more
open, and that the Office Chiefs should have been more involved in the process
instead of using a top-down approach. One Assistant Director said the Agency
Director did not communicate his decisions and rationale, and that as a Assistant
Director,

.. if I don’t know that, there’s trouble.” While one Assistant Director

said that the Agency Director needed the full support o f the Commission and the
Governor, another said that the Commission should have called some closed-door
meetings because they did not understand the restructuring plan and its goals.
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Another item mentioned was that the timeframe for implementation o f the plan was
too fast. One Assistant Director said that the Assistant Directors as a whole should
have united and said that the restructuring plan was not good for the agency. Another
said that the Agency ended up being split into two agencies, and summed up the
whole process by saying, “It was a disaster.”
The Office Chiefs felt that the Agency Director needed to more precisely
identify what the problem was, and how the restructuring plan would benefit the
Agency and solve the identified problem. They strongly felt that the Agency Director
should have involved them early on in the process and obtained their input and
commitment. Also, that he should have done much more communicating with them,
and that there needed to be a longer timeframe for implementing the plan. One Office
Chief said that nothing the Assistant Directors or Office Chiefs did could have
changed the Agency Director’s mind regarding restructuring, that only the
Governor’s Office or the Commission could have dissuaded him from the
restructuring proposal.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The model of sensemaking developed for this study, coupled with the
interviews conducted, resulted in several conclusions. The four major areas o f the
model are Argument, Expectation, Commitment, and Manipulation.
First, the results from the interviews relating to Argument showed great
variation. The Agency Director felt that he made a persuasive argument for the
restructuring. The Assistant Directors and Office Chiefs did not, and viewed their
support as being low. The Agency Director also viewed their support as low.
The results regarding Commitment showed that the Agency Director was
viewed as strongly committed to the restructuring. Its impact on the organization was
rated by the Assistant Directors and Office Chiefs as high, and negative. The
Assistant Directors were viewed by themselves, and the Office Chiefs, as not being
committed, and this impact on the organization was rated highly negative. The Office
Chiefs were viewed as having medium to low commitment, with a high, negative
impact on the organization.
As for Expectation, the Agency Director and the Assistant Directors had high
expectations that the Agency Director would restructure the Agency. The Office
Chiefs differed significantly in that they did not expect restructuring to take place.
The Office Chiefs also expected that the Assistant Directors would do little regarding
restructuring.
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In terms o f Manipulation, the results showed that the Agency Director did
make attempts to create a supportive environment for the restructuring plan, but the
Assistant Directors and the Office Chiefs did little.
In summary, there was a significant disconnect between the three groups at
the level o f Argument and Expectation, which Weick identified as the key
components in the arena o f Belief. In general, the Assistant Directors and the Office
Chiefs were not convinced and did not believe that restructuring was appropriate for
the Agency.
Similarly, on the Action spectrum there was a tremendous dichotomy between
the Agency Director on the one hand, and the Assistant Directors and Office Chiefs
on the other. The Agency Director was in an Action mode, and the others were not.
It is my contention that these results reflect a prescription for failure. They
show that the Agency Director, Assistant Directors, and Office Chiefs did not display
consistent strength in any o f the four quadrants o f the model o f sensemaking.
As was mentioned in Chapter I, Weick (1995) maintains that there is no
directional order to sensemaking, that it is not necessary to address the components
of the model in any particular order. The results o f this study suggest that it is
important, if not imperative, that the area o f Belief comprised o f Argument and
Expectation, be consistent at the leadership level in order for there to be an effective
Action, which is comprised o f Commitment and Manipulation. If key members of
leadership are not in concert on the former, there is weakness in the latter. This study
shows that such a weakness continuously eroded and eventually brought failure to
the restructuring proposal.
Weick’s (1995) concept of sensemaking provides an interesting framework
for further analyzing the interactions of the Leadership Team. Alan Briskin (1996)
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provides an additional framework for continuing that discussion and further analyzing
the Leadership Team.
Briskin (1996) indicates that the soul as an ancient hypothesis has at least four
core themes. The first is that soul is connected with the underworld, a place of depth
and shadowy realities that connect us to the unconscious facets o f ourselves. The
second core theme is that soul is associated with our vitality and renewal. The third is
that soul is a place o f union among opposites, the light and dark aspects o f the whole
individual. And the fourth is that the soul is a bridge to the cosmic aspect of
consciousness. He says that approaching the soul means going deeper into a place in
which the past and the future mesh, where what we strive for and what drives and
motivates us can be glimpsed.
Briskin (1996) purports that multiplicity is an aspect o f soul. This is in
contrast to modem organizations that have developed since the Industrial Revolution,
in which the concept is that there is an individual personality shaped by the
requirements o f work and the internal control that individuals are supposed to have
over themselves. He indicates that this often puts individuals at cross-purposes with
themselves.
Briskin (1996) discusses it being essential that we see through and beyond,
that we use a “third eye” (p. 8) to assist us in seeing with a heightened awareness. He
indicates that in order to see with the soul one must engage in a certain stillness and
attentiveness. The stillness creates an opening in the surface o f the world we exist in,
while attentiveness guides one out o f the thoughts and beliefs that may ensnare us. So
he says that “The challenge o f finding soul in organizations, as in life, is to embrace
not only what we see, hear, and understand but also to attend to what we don’t
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know, what we cannot see at first glance or hear on first listening” (Briskin, 1996,
p. 9). This concept is complementary with sensemaking.
Soul is a concept that is increasingly used in the world o f management and the
workplace. However, it is an ancient idea in both the East and West. The soul stands
for the multiplicity o f selves within each o f us. The interactions and struggles o f each
of these selves are the threads that weave the entire self together. As with all o f us,
the Agency Director also had a multiplicity of selves. Even though he was the
Agency Director, he felt that he didn’t know enough and wasn’t as smart as others on
his Leadership Team. This fear manifested itself in defensive behavior as well as
reliance on his formal authority as Director of the organization. This fear was brought
to the forefront early in his administration. At a 2-day retreat for the Leadership
Team, all members engaged in a series of psychological, diagnostic tests. The Agency
Director was consistently the last person to complete these tests, having difficulty
completing the exams, in my opinion, because of his desire to ensure that he was
giving the correct response.
At times we must consult parts of ourselves that are difficult to hold onto.
“The dread and resistance which every natural human being experiences, when it
comes to delving too deeply into himself is, at bottom, the fear o f the journey to
Hades” (Jung, 1953, p. 336). However, the cost o f refusing to go there can be
severe.
The Leadership Team engaged in such a journey shortly after the Agency
Director came on board. Working as a group through the series o f diagnostic tests
and personality profiles mentioned earlier allowed each member o f the Leadership
Team to take a hard look at themselves, and to glimpse insights into the personality
makeup o f other individuals o f the Leadership Team. In one instance a member o f the
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Leadership Team determined that a different career path outside of the organization
was most appropriate for him.
When observing a meeting where something significant is left unsaid, there is
always a moment when we notice a deadening in the conversation, which can also be
described as a point where a meeting becomes “empty or even soulless.” Briskin
(1996) says, “At these moments, we fear the journey to Hades, far below the surface
of the situation, where danger lurks in the form of a spontaneous eruption of the truth
or the expression of strong emotion” (p. 14). Many such moments existed within the
Leadership Team meetings as discussions regarding reorganization and restructuring
were pursued. Quite often there was little said in opposition to the Agency Director’s
stated desire to restructure, simply because over time the other members of the
Leadership Team learned that such comments were not welcome, were not invited,
and in fact caused greater stress within the meeting between those individuals who
were in disagreement with each other. As time went on, there were more of those
situations and they became more significant in terms of their impact on the individuals
of the Leadership Team as well as the organization.
The Swiss physician and analytic psychologist Carl Jung also believed that
there was a struggle of opposites within each of us. He said that each of us have a
conscious intention to be good and live up to our ethical aspirations, but we also have
an unconscious aspect. This unconscious aspect he called the shadow. Jung felt that
the manner in which we deal with our shadow is an indication of our capacity for selfknowledge. In order to recognize the shadow and acknowledge it and deal with its
contradictions requires considerable reflection and effort by the individual.
One finds that Briskin (1996) talks about the “dark; side,” or shadow, that
must be accounted for in ourselves and in others. He takes this position because
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normally one would ignore or repress the dark: side of the soul. Briskin indicates that
in organizations both the leadership and staff have something to gain from paying
attention to the shadow. Even though leaders may have good intentions, when they
go astray it results in decreased credibility. While recognizing the shadow may not
solve this problem, it does give an opportunity for leaders and staff1to at least
acknowledge and assess responsibility for unaddressed factors o f their own
personality.
To an extent, it appeared that the Agency Director operated from a position
of fear. On several occasions he stated that he probably did not have the same level of
innate intelligence as the people he was surrounded with on the Leadership Team. A
further explanation is that he also had a fear that he did not have the capacity and the
ability to fully carry out the responsibilities o f the job of Agency Director. These fears
and anxieties manifested themselves in his reliance upon the formal power of his
position as Agency Director. It was easier to rely upon this type o f power, than to
engage in the much more complex approach o f persuasion and of leading his
Leadership Team and the organization into a new and different future. This was a
major gap, and I believe a major contribution, to the failure o f the restructuring plan.
The inability to persuade the majority of the Leadership Team and the staff and to
give rationale for the changes being pursued resulted in people not being able to see
the new direction as a positive approach. Rather, it was viewed as a personal threat
to them and to the organization.
Another conclusion is that the Agency Director did not internally believe in
the course that he was charting. Rather, the restructuring was his interpretation o f
what he thought the Governor and the Commission wanted him to do. As a result,
this left him with a deep personal conflict. This deep personal conflict led him to
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exhibit the anger and brought out the shadow side o f his personality. With this
shadow side o f his personality in the forefront on many occasions, it became
extremely difficult for him to lead the organization and persuade even a majority of
his Leadership Team to support his course o f action.
According to Alan Briskin (1996), “The shadow offers us access to the
unresolved issues o f our past, the dispossessed feelings, attitudes, and emotions that
can offer new vitality and a more comprehensive humanity, if recognized” (p. 58).
One possible explanation is that the Agency Director did not get in touch with his
shadow, and therefore maintained these unresolved issues in his own personal
makeup. Again, this was manifested by his feelings of insecurity in his position. These
unresolved issues led to his uncompromising approach to the restructuring o f the
Agency and the anger that he displayed toward those he felt were not supportive of
him.
The message that lies at the heart of all spiritual teachings is: you cannot be
someone else. Briskin (1996) indicates that each of us struggles with the question of
being more folly who we are, as opposed to becoming someone else’s idea. He says,
“In organizations we are constantly distracted from this essential question because
the pull to live up to someone else’s expectation is so profound” (p. 87). This was a
central struggle that the Agency Director experienced. His interpretation of the
desires and expectations o f the Governor’s Office and staff, as well as the
Commission, were to a large extent in conflict with his own personal desires.
Compounding this dilemma was the Agency Director’s lack of confidence that the
course he was taking was in fact what was expected o f him. He often relied upon
indirect messages and trying to read between the lines o f comments made by staff
from the Governor’s Office as to what was expected of him by the Governor.
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However, he only rarely spoke directly with the Governor regarding his actions and
policies.
“The employee who clings too tightly to behaviors that were once accepted
and rewarded as good may be limiting his capacity to change in beneficial ways”
(Briskin, 1996, p. 37). I believe that this was one o f the factors that affected some
members of the Leadership Team and their interactions with other members o f the
Leadership Team. The Agency Director was attempting to make significant changes
not only in the structure o f the organization, but in its thought processes and its
approach to accomplishing the mission of the Agency. Some of the Assistant
Directors did not really want to embrace that kind o f change. While they provided lip
service and acknowledged that the organization needed to change, in their hearts they
really did not believe it.
Briskin (1996) also states that “The senior manager who too fully embraces
new management ideologies may be missing crucial information about the reality of
her organization, as opposed to the vision” (p. 37). This may explain the Agency
Director’s immediate embracing of total quality management. Even though he
embraced the TQM concepts, he didn’t take time to fully understand them, and he
did not practice those concepts on a consistent basis.
There is also a collective shadow which can relate to members of a group. In
regards to the restructuring proposal, there certainly was a collective shadow in terms
of field staff and their views o f the Agency Director and leadership in the central
office. Conversely, the Agency Director and some members of the Leadership Team
had a similar collective shadow in terms of their regard for the field staff affected by
the restructuring, namely, the Regional Supervisors.
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Briskin (1996) says that when individuals in organizations are confronted with
realities that are at odds with their ideals, they cast off the parts that they reject and
project them onto others. This occurred between the Agency Director and some
members of the Leadership Team. Some of the Assistant Directors and Office Chiefs
disagreed strongly with the direction that the Agency Director was taking in terms of
restructuring. They utilized methods at their disposal short o f a direct, personal
confrontation with the Agency Director, to undermine the direction that he was
taking. This same dynamic was taking place between staff people in the field who
were to be directly affected by the restructuring proposal and their management.
Over time, the informal grapevine allowed staff to make their own determinations as
to which Office Chiefs and/or Assistant Directors were supportive o f the Agency
Director and which ones were not. Of course they allied themselves with those
managers who shared their viewpoint.
The Agency Director also employed this behavior by determining which of
the Assistant Directors and Office Chiefs he felt were not supportive o f his
restructuring proposal, and therefore, not supportive of him. These continuing
tensions and dichotomies over a period of months, and in some cases years, lead to a
paralysis of action within the Agency.
Another thought of Briskin's is that relying on one’s self can amount to both
productive independence and a dangerous withdrawal from the group. Ignoring
issues that make people angry or frightened can be appropriate in the short term and
yet dangerous if never addressed. This delicate balancing act was taking place on an
almost daily basis, between the Agency Director and members o f the Leadership
Team. On the whole, over time, the pendulum shifted more toward the Agency
Director withdrawing from the group on the major issues being discussed, and being

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

126
reluctant to engage in discussions on the restructuring issues which he knew there
was little support for from the majority o f the Leadership Team.
Briskin (1996) says, “The needs o f the workplace and those o f the individual
are not necessarily contradictory, but neither are they necessarily compatible” (p. 67).
This raises a key dilemma that was faced by the Agency Director and the Leadership
Team in attempting to implement the restructuring proposals. Those whose positions
would be directly affected by the restructuring addressed their individual needs and
determined that they were contradictory to the needs o f the workplace. Those
individuals, the Regional Supervisors, felt threatened directly by the proposal. Hence,
they felt directly threatened by the Agency Director and the organization. The
additional time and flexibility which may have provided for development o f plans to
mitigate the impacts on these individuals was not allowed. Such mitigating factors as
phasing in the restructuring over time in order to lessen the impacts on individuals
and to avoid having to reduce people’s levels of pay could have gone a long ways
toward merging the needs of the workplace and of those individuals.
According to Briskin (1996), “To think as a living soul is to challenge and be
challenged by our surroundings” (p. 138). This is exactly what happened within the
Agency relating to the restructuring proposal. Many staf£ especially those affected
directly by the restructuring proposal, were vocal in their opposition. This manifested
itself even to the point where those staff members attended public meetings held by
the Agency in order to voice their opposition to the direction that the Agency
Director and the Leadership Team were pursuing. The lack of a clear rationale and a
persuasive reason for eliminating the Regional Supervisor positions further fueled the
questions that these employees posed in opposition to the plan.
Briskin (1996) says:
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Logos requires opportunities to gain a voice so that fantasies of what is really
happening under the crust of logic can be explored, questioned, and engaged.
Logos is sought through redundancy, through repeated opportunities to voice
one’s inward thought so that it may be heard, challenged, and allowed a place
among the ideas o f others, (p. 139)
Many employees, staff, and some members o f the Leadership Team felt that their
thoughts did not receive an adequate airing, and that they were not being heard.
Conversely, the Agency Director was not inclined to have his thoughts and ideas
challenged in order to more fully explain the rationale for the restructuring proposal.
One explanation is that this occurred because he was uncomfortable and unsure that
the rationale for the restructuring could survive the scrutiny. I believe he felt this way
because he was tom as to whether the approach was the right approach, and was
uncomfortable with the fact that there was not a strong, logical rationale for
eliminating the Regional Supervisors, other than the fact that there was a need to
achieve some budget reductions.
One possible explanation of the Agency Director’s approach as the
restructuring debate continued is captured by Briskin (1996) in the following quote:
“In organizations, logos is constantly bounded by the immediate rush for solutions.
Deeper reflection is suspect, considered potentially wasteful, associated with
“paralysis by analysis” (p. 141). The Agency Director had determined the course that
was to be followed. He was not interested in further analysis or discussion regarding
those decisions. He was impatient with any further challenge or lack of support for
the course of action he had determined.
Briskin (1996) further indicates that communication plans within
organizations which are designed to inform staff about the reasons and the logic for
change instead inhibit logos when only the voice of leadership is heard, and that logos
implies a need to hear from many constituencies within an organization. This was
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never effectively achieved by the Agency Director or the Leadership Team during the
restructuring process. However, many other constituencies were heard from, and
they voiced their opposition to the plan. The inability to co-opt these major
constituency groups resulted in a dynamic of confrontation. The ultimate arbiters of
those confrontations became the Commission, and by extension, the Governor’s
Office. With such conflicting views being expressed, the Commission opted for
supporting a more middle o f the road course of action in an attempt to appease the
constituency groups and avoid, to the extent possible, appearing to be nonsupportive
of the Agency Director and the Leadership Team.
The theologian Matthew Fox (1994) writes that work
comes from inside out; work is the expression of our soul, our inner being. It
is unique to the individual; it is creative. Work is an expression of the Spirit at
work in the world through us. Work is that which puts us in touch with
others, not so much at the level o f personal interaction, but at the level of
service in the community, (p. 5)
This is an apt description o f how staff in the field perceived their efforts and their
jobs. The restructuring proposal was perceived as a direct attack on not only their
jobs, but them as individuals. They interpreted the restructuring proposal as a
statement that their efforts were not highly valued within the organization, or more
specifically by the Agency Director and the Leadership Team. This type o f reflection
and interpretation by the Agency’s field staff aims directly at the challenge Briskin
indicates we face in associating work with meaning. He says, “The spirit in which we
do our work is intimately related to the products of our efforts, to the service we
provide to the larger community’’ (Briskin, 1996, p. 143). The staff’s strong views
and beliefs in the matter of their contributions to protecting the environment were
directly being challenged by the restructuring proposal.
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In the restructuring proposals that were put forth by the Agency Director and
the Leadership Team, the opportunity for logos to occur within staff, and even the
Leadership Team, was not encouraged at all. If an approach to the restructuring had
been taken which allowed individuals to creatively identify ways to achieve the goals
of restructuring, and thereby increase the opportunities for staff buy-in to the
restructuring, the chances for success may have been much greater.
Briskin (1996) indicates that an individual’s role is related to the soul because
it is rooted in an ability to reflect, and to sense what is most critical within
relationships. The Agency Director viewed his role as dictating the course of events.
He viewed the role of staff as being that of following the dictates o f management.
Briskin says:
Role taking is an active rather than passive response to our environment. In
taking up role, we find out something about our courage and creativity in
how we respond to the opportunities and constraints of our world. We
become active participants in our destiny, (p. 197)
The Agency Director made a conscious decision regarding his role in the
restructuring plan. That role was to mandate what course would be followed. The
Assistant Directors also determined what their role would be in the restructuring
plan. A couple of them were supportive. However, several were not supportive and
decided to play a role of undermining the restructuring plan, and covertly, if not
overtly, resisting it.
The role that one assumes allows one to define the parameters o f work, and
determine the aspects that are most meaningful to one’s position in the organization.
Briskin says that by assuming a role, one can protect oneself from the psychological
assault of the expectations of others. One is able to do this because one knows who
they are and what the organization is attempting to do. The Agency Director firmly
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believed that the course o f action he was pursuing in regard to restructuring was a
correct one, and that he was able to withstand the criticism and stay the course on the
restructuring proposal because of his view of his role in the organization. Several of
the Assistant Directors and the Office Chiefs reached a completely different
conclusion based on their view of their role in the organization. These differing views
of role, especially in regard to restructuring, allowed for the different conclusions and
actions based upon the same data.
This concept of role takes into consideration the person, the role and its
relations with others and the system in which all action takes place. The restructuring
proposal put into motion a variety of roles within the staff. These roles were
constantly changing and adapting to the restructuring proposal as it changed over
time.
Briskin (1996) says that the assigned role is what others have determined is
our place within an organization. He indicates that these assigned roles are how
others within the organization view a person’s place within the group. It is my
contention that the various staff within the Agency, including some Assistant
Directors, Office Chiefs, and field staff determined that even though the Agency
Director obviously held a critical role within the organization, that he was assigned a
role by the staff that resulted in his being viewed as ineffective in his job.
According to Briskin (1996), “The danger o f the assigned role in
organizations is that it can place us in a box from which we cannot escape” (p. 205).
This is what happened to the Agency Director. He became viewed as ineffective
within the organization because of the restructuring proposal. He also was viewed as
being a mere instrument o f the Governor’s Office, and by extension, the Commission.
Therefore, the general view being held by staff was that the Agency Director was not
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taking action in the best interest of the Agency, but was doing what others felt should
be done. Briskin sums up what happened to the Agency Director very succinctly
when he says, “The assigned role, often unspoken, has the potential to become
destructive because feedback to or about the individual becomes narrower and
prejudiced in a certain direction” (p. 205).
A possible explanation is that the Agency Director did not really go through a
full process of reflection and creativity to determine his role. Instead, he adopted
what he felt was the role expected of him by some members o f the Commission and
the Governor’s Office. He did not view himself as having the opportunity or
flexibility to create what he felt his role should be. While this in and of itself was not a
necessarily negative position to take, what was missing was the nexus between the
organization and the Agency Director’s desires.
Briskin (1996) further states, “Taking up one’s role, even when we don’t
quite get it right, affords others the opportunity to take up their own stance. We
cannot give someone else a role, but we can model it and learn from the
consequences” (p. 208). Once the Agency Director had determined his role and the
course o f action, it did afford others the opportunity to determine what their
positions would be. While the Agency Director hoped that he would be able to
persuade the Leadership Team, the Office Chiefs, and staff to support the
restructuring proposal, he was not able to achieve that to a significant degree.
However, the Agency Director utilized his organizational power and personal
power in support of the restructuring proposals.
Briskin (1996) discusses the fact that individuals have their own views of the
organization, and that our behavior emerges from this picture that we have o f the
organization. He indicates that we often act, even without awareness, in relation to
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our internalized view o f the organization. Further, he states that this picture is created
as a result of our experience. It is my contention that the experience of the Director
in the organization was significantly different from the experiences of other members
of the Leadership Team. The Agency Director had worked the majority of his 25+
year career in one division of the Agency. Most of the other members of the
Leadership Team had experience working in multiple areas o f the Agency, and
therefore had a broader perspective o f the organization and its functioning.
Consequently, there were competing views regarding the restructuring proposal, and
the effectiveness and need for the Regional Supervisor level of management in the
Field structure. To an extent, the tension within the Leadership Team was a result of
these differing backgrounds of experience between the members.
Briskin (1996) explores applying the concept o f multiple perspectives to
system thinking. It leads us to want to know and appreciate how others view the
same system. For example, are individuals within a system aware of their external
environment? Do they all interpret what is outside the boundary of their system in the
same way? Do individuals respond with different emotions?
The internal pictures that employees create will shape behavior as much as the
external factors and processes that affect them. This offers some significant insight as
to what happened at the Agency. Many o f the staff, especially Field staff and the
Regional Supervisors, and in some cases the Regional Assistant Directors, held an
emotional connection to their past, and a sense that they were serving their
communities. There was an emotional connection in terms o f the strong belief that
they were protecting the environment, not only for the citizens but for future
generations.
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The restructuring proposals put forth by the Agency Director and the
Leadership Team did not fully account for these different perspectives that existed
within the organization. Rather, the attempt was to overrule and ignore these
perspectives due to the overriding concerns that were behind the restructuring, such
as budget constraints and the need for a flatter organization with less management.
Hirschhom and Gilmore (1992) suggest that when the authority boundary is
not being managed well, that the tension necessary between leading and following is
tom apart. This then leads to rebellion, distrust, and passivity. This is what happened
during the restructuring proposal. There was a breakdown in trust between the
Leadership Team o f the Agency and the staff. The various subgroups within the
Agency polarized. This led to a struggle for power between the Agency Director and
Leadership Team, and staff. Many staff felt exploited and angry.
Briskin (1996) says, “When one’s identity feels threatened, leading to fear of
annihilation, individuals become deeply mistrustful and act contemptuously toward
each other” (p. 229). This is what happened.
Briskin (1996) talks about an organization having a “preserving system” and a
“purposeful system.” In the preserving system, the focus is internal and is concerned
with people and their feelings, customs, and habits. The preserving system has human
relations that exist outside o f the scope of direct managerial control. This inward
focus can lead members to concentrate on how to repel change. New management is
many times viewed as something that will come and go. In the process of
restructuring, it is my contention that not enough attention was paid to the preserving
system of the Agency. While attempts were made to explain the need for the changes
and the restructuring due to outside forces, these arguments were not persuasive.
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Briskin (1996) states, “Leaders who attempt too dramatic a change are
messing with a life form that can mutate unexpectedly and in unforeseen ways”
(p. 233). This is what happened in the Agency. The restructuring and the elimination
of positions did not occur in a timely manner and were discussed for many months.
Over time, the anger o f staff and their belief that the rationale for the restructuring
was not persuasive, led some of them to act overtly in opposition to the restructuring
plan. Again, this was evidenced by staff giving public testimony in opposition to the
restructuring plan.
Conversely, the purposeful system pays more attention to the boundary
between the organization and its environment. It takes into account the environment,
rather than focusing entirely on internal relations. The Agency Director and the
Leadership Team never effectively managed this boundary between the purposeful
system and the preserving system. This failure to effectively manage that boundary
led to the dissension and lack of support by Agency staff for the restructuring, and
also resulted in a lack o f support by the external environment, evidenced by the
constituency groups that argued strongly against the restructuring as well.
From a different perspective, it can be argued that field staff focused too
greatly on the preserving system, and were not open to different ways o f performing
their job responsibilities. By taking this narrow view, they hindered the Agency’s
ability to react and adjust to changing factors impacting the Agency from its external
environment.
Briskin discusses the differences between power and authority. Authority, in
general, relates to one’s position within the organization. Power, however, comes
from an array of personal and individualistic attributes. In order to be effective, one
needs both authority and power when taking actions. While the Agency Director had
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the authority to take the actions for restructuring, he did not couple it with the
personal power and attributes to allow him to persuade others to follow that
authority.
In summary, Weick’s (1995) theory o f sensemaking provided the basis for
analyzing the Agency and the proposals for restructuring. The model developed from
that theory offered a framework to analyze the effects of the proposals on the
organization and the actions and decisions o f the Leadership Team. Utilization o f
Weick’s theory and the model developed in this study provides a new approach for
the study o f leadership and organizational change, one which allows for the
examination of actions in relation to the components of the model.
Briskin (1996) and his work provides concepts which help to further explore
the motives behind the actions of individuals, and adds more depth to the application
of sensemaking by focusing on the internal make-up of individuals and how this
impacts on their actions relating to what is happening at the organizational level.
Then combination o f the concepts of these two authors provided for a more
rich, robust analysis and establishes a basis for its application in future studies.
Future Research
Weick (1995) indicates that there are certain methodologies that can be
utilized to understand sensemaking. These examples include utilizing naturalistic
inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), grounded theory (Wicker, 1992), case scenarios
(Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993, p. 261), interviews (Fineman, 1983) and others. He
takes these numerous and diverse studies and identifies the following 10
characteristics, which suggest a mindset for methodology that tends to be associated
with sensemaking:
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1. Investigators make an effort to preserve action that is situated in context.
2. Observers rely less on researcher-specified measures and more on what
participants say and do in response to minimal prodding and prestructuring.
3. Observers work in close rather than from the armchair.
4. Participants, rather than observers, define the work environment.
5. Findings are described in terms o f patterns rather than hypotheses.
6. Explanations are tested as much against common sense and plausibility as
against a priori theories.
7. Density of information and vividness of meaning are as crucial as are
precision and replicability.
8. There tends to be intensive examination o f a small number of cases rather
than selective examination o f a large number of cases, under the assumption that
person-situation interactions tend to be similar across classes of people and
situations.
9. Sensemaking tends to be especially visible in the settings observed.
Settings are chosen more for their access to the phenomenon than for their
representativeness.
10. Observers mobilize a set o f methodological tactics that enables them to
deal with meanings rather than frequency counts.
Based on this, Weick (1995) suggests that one potential area of study is in the
area o f commitment. When people become committed to an action, sensemaking then
focuses on searching for explanations to justify that action. Therefore, interventions
that assist people in taking action should reduce confusion.
There is a current movement away from hierarchy and the vertical structuring
of organizations toward more horizontal structuring and self-managed teams.
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Research in this area can focus on sensemaking when it is organized horizontally and
explore changes in socialization, selection and, scanning.
Weick (1995) also suggests that we need to know more about the boundary
conditions for sensemaking processes, such as enactment, behavioral commitment,
innovation, and the management of meaning. He says that we need to know more
about what happens to interpretation when the constraints of context, distributed
information, and differentials in power vary. He also indicates that we need to know
more about sensemaking under conditions o f low discretion, to determine which
processes are used and which are avoided. Weick also suggests that another growing
area o f importance is the relationship between information technology and
sensemaking. The issue is the disparity between the speed and complexity o f
information technology and the ability o f humans to comprehend its outputs.
With this background, I would offer several suggestions for further research
in the area of sensemaking. One area would be to take the model o f sensemaking
developed in this study and look for opportunities to further refine it. In other words,
what further detail or breakdown of the model in the four major categories
(argument, expectation, commitment, manipulation), or identify one of those four
major areas for a detailed study or review within an organizational setting.
A second area for research would be further refinement and delineation o f the
questions utilized in the interview instrument for this study. How can the existing
questions be improved upon in terms o f their wording, and their ability to elicit
responses. Additionally, what new questions could be asked that would more fully
explore the concepts o f each of these areas of sensemaking.
A third area o f inquiry would be to focus on comparisons of sensemaking
between individuals in an organization, but more importantly, between individuals
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internal and external to the organization under study. In other words, a comparison
of sensemaking from these internal and external perspectives could shed additional
insight as to how one’s position within an organization or in relationship to an
organization affects one’s interpretation and perception o f events.
Another area of inquiry is to take an event and explore people’s perception of
it from various levels in the organization. For example, this study concentrated on
interviews with individuals at different levels in the organization, however the focus
was still on the top levels of management. Further research could concentrate on a
more stratified sample of all levels within an organization to determine how
sensemaking occurs regarding a particular event from those various perspectives.
From such studies, results may identify differences in sensemaking based on one’s
level within an organization.
Another area for research would be to explore opportunities for identifying
more structured approaches and different methodological approaches to sensemaking
that put some boundaries and form or format to sensemaking research. This seems, at
first encounter, to be contrary to the whole sensemaking approach described by
Weick, which is very broad in nature. However, in order to encourage its use within
organizations and by individuals at various levels within those organizations, it is my
opinion that there needs to be additional, concrete instruction to assist individuals in
engaging in sensemaking activities. If the whole topic of sensemaking is left too
broadly defined, then to many it will appear that there really is no such approach that
will benefit them. The risk is that sensemaking will be viewed as an idea without
much focus. The idea of a growing body o f research and knowledge utilizing different
specific techniques can result in different examples of how to explore sensemaking
within organizations, and allows leaders, managers, and practitioners of the art to
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identify the specific approaches which they feel will be most useful in furthering
sensemaking within their organization.
Finally, this study raises several questions, fix terms of methodology, does the
method that was utilized necessitate the fixing o f credit or blame on a particular
person in the organization? From a public policy perspective, does a failure of
internal transformation enable and/or force external efforts at change? And from an
organizational perspective, does a perceived need to retain power and position
impede internal transformation?
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This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled “Implementing
Organizational Change: Sensemaking and the Case o f the Michigan Department o f Natural
Resources, 1992-1995” has been approved under the exem pt category o f review by the Human
Subjects Institutional R eview Board. The conditions and duration o f this approval are specified
in the Policies o f Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research
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if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below . In addition if there are any
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research, you should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair o f the HSIRB for
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The Board wishes you success in the pursuit o f your research goals.
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